Multiple independent snapshots of market pricing around August 23, 2024 show that futures / CME FedWatch probabilities for the September 18, 2024 FOMC meeting were roughly:

• ~70–76% probability of a 25 bp cut
• ~24–30% probability of a 50 bp cut
• Essentially 0% probability of no cut (all probability mass on some size of cut)

For example:

• FX Leaders, citing the CME FedWatch tool on August 23, 2024, reported a 75.5% probability of a 25 bp cut and 24.5% probability of a 50 bp cut for September. (fxleaders.com)
• VStar’s August 26, 2024 market overview similarly noted 75.5% odds of a 25 bp cut and 24.5% odds of a 50 bp cut at the September FOMC. (vstar.com)
• A Reuters piece on August 23, 2024 (via Business Recorder) said traders were pricing a 73% chance of a 25 bp cut and 27% chance of a 50 bp cut next month, with no mention of a meaningful “no cut” probability. (brecorder.com)
• Intercam’s August 23, 2024 note cited FedWatch showing 71.5% probability of a 25 bp cut in September, implying roughly the remaining ~28.5% on a 50 bp cut. (intercamblog.com)
• A recap of FedWatch probabilities for the week ending August 16, 2024 similarly showed 71.5% for a 25 bp cut and 28.5% for a 50 bp cut at the September 2024 meeting. (indiainfoline.com)

Friedberg’s description — “50 or 75% chance of a quarter point cut. 20% chance of a 50 basis point cut and then 6% chance of no cut” — is an approximate, verbal summary of this distribution. The core structure matches the data:

• He correctly characterizes a large majority (roughly three-quarters) probability on a 25 bp cut, consistent with the 71–76% range actually implied by FedWatch and futures pricing.
• He assigns a smaller but significant probability (~20%) to a 50 bp cut, which is close (within a few percentage points) to the observed ~24–30% range.
• He notes a small residual probability (~6%) of no cut, which overstates what FedWatch snapshots suggest (essentially 0%), but still correctly conveys that no cut was viewed as a low-probability tail outcome.

Because the prediction was explicitly about what prediction markets were implying at that time, not about which outcome would actually occur, it should be judged against contemporaneous market data rather than the eventual decision (which was a 50 bp cut on September 18, 2024). (reuters.com) On that basis, his qualitative breakdown (big probability on 25 bp cut, smaller on 50 bp, very little on no cut) is substantively accurate, with only modest numerical imprecision.

Given the available evidence, the statement is basically correct as an approximate description of late‑August 2024 prediction‑market probabilities, so it is best classified as "right".