As of 30 November 2025, the prediction has not materialized on any of its key points.

1. No evidence of Chinese 3 nm entering volume production in Q3 2025

   • Mainstream reporting still describes SMIC’s most advanced mass-produced node as 7 nm, constrained by U.S. export controls that block access to EUV lithography. Analyses note SMIC is researching 5 nm and 3 nm, but not yet producing them at scale, and remains at least several generations behind TSMC and Intel. (lemonde.fr)
   • Huawei/SMIC roadmaps consistently put true 3 nm chips in 2026: Huawei is reported to be working with SMIC on a 3 nm GAA design, with lab validation done and production-line adaptation underway, but the design is expected to be sent to SMIC and/or taped out in 2026, not manufactured in volume in 2025. (mobileworldlive.com)
   • Reports on China’s first domestic immersion DUV lithography tool say it targets roughly 28 nm initially and might be extended to 7 nm/5 nm via multipatterning, with integration into production lines only around 2027 and advanced-node mass production not expected before ~2030. That timeline is incompatible with broad 3 nm volume production starting in Q3 2025. (tomshardware.com)
     Together, these sources strongly indicate that while 3 nm R&D is underway, China did not have domestically-developed 3 nm technology in volume production by Q3 2025.

2. Conflicting niche articles don’t demonstrate Q3 2025 volume production

   • A ChinaCrunch piece from October 2025 claims SMIC has “successfully produces 3-nanometer (nm) chips domestically” and even says these are deployed in AI data centers and other applications. (chinacrunch.com) However, it does not tie this to a Q3 2025 start of volume production, does not quantify scale, and is not corroborated by Reuters, Nikkei, or other primary industry sources, which still describe SMIC as effectively capped at 7 nm mass production. (lemonde.fr)
   • Given the lack of independent confirmation and the continued depiction of SMIC as 7 nm–limited with yield problems at more advanced nodes, this article is better interpreted as highlighting experimental or very limited 3 nm capability, not the kind of high-yield volume production implied in the prediction.

3. No “significant share” of leading-edge capacity has shifted from Taiwan to mainland China

   • TSMC has been in high-volume 3 nm production since 2022; by Q3 2025, 3 nm processes contributed about 23% of its wafer revenue and 5 nm another 37%, meaning advanced nodes (3/5/7 nm) account for roughly three quarters of its sales. (stocks.observer-reporter.com)
   • TSMC’s roadmap shows 2 nm mass production ramping from late 2025 into 2026, with large 2 nm fabs being built in Hsinchu and Kaohsiung, reinforcing Taiwan as the core base of leading‑edge capacity. (roic.ai)
   • Meanwhile, coverage of China’s chip sector continues to describe SMIC as the only Chinese foundry at 7 nm and emphasizes its difficulty ramping that node due to export controls and domestic tool limitations—hardly consistent with capturing a significant share of global 3 nm/5 nm capacity. (marketscreener.com)
     There is no sign that a “significant share of leading-edge chip manufacturing capacity” has migrated from TSMC in Taiwan to mainland China by late 2025.

4. Why this is already judged wrong rather than ‘too early’
   The prediction had an early, time-bounded milestone (“go into [volume] production in Q3 of 2025”) that is already in the past and clearly unmet by any credible, independently corroborated evidence. Even optimistic Chinese and industry reports place genuine 3 nm manufacturing for Huawei/SMIC in 2026 and frame 2025 as an R&D and preparation year, not a volume‑production ramp. (mobileworldlive.com)
   Since this prerequisite step has effectively failed, and there has been no observable shift of leading-edge capacity from Taiwan to China, the overall forecast cannot plausibly come true in the form stated, even though 2026 is not yet over.

Conclusion: The available evidence shows no Chinese 3 nm volume production in Q3 2025 and no major relocation of leading-edge capacity from Taiwan to mainland China. On that basis, the prediction is best classified as wrong.