The prediction’s horizon is “over the next couple of decades” from a 2022 podcast, i.e., roughly the early‑to‑mid 2040s. As of the current date (late 2025), that time has not arrived, so we cannot yet say whether:

1. China will have built ~400 nuclear power plants (or reactors).

   • Public data today show China has on the order of a few dozen operating nuclear reactors and several dozen more under construction or planned, not hundreds of plants already built. Long‑term projections (e.g., Chinese policy targets and IAEA/OECD projections) discuss aggressive build‑out scenarios but do not establish what will actually be in place by the 2040s. These are future plans, not completed outcomes.

2. Chinese industrial electricity costs will fall below $0.05/kWh because of this build‑out.

   • Current industrial power prices in China vary by region and policy (including coal, renewables, and nuclear), and while some tariffs can approach or dip below $0.05/kWh in certain conditions, there is no definitive evidence yet that a nuclear‑driven large‑scale, sustained sub‑$0.05/kWh regime for industry has been locked in for the 2040s.

3. That will reliably give China a major cost advantage over U.S. manufacturing due specifically to electricity cost differentials of roughly $0.05 vs. $0.11–0.12/kWh.

   • U.S. industrial electricity prices and Chinese industrial prices both fluctuate with fuel costs, regulation, technology mix, and policy. It is not yet possible to verify what the relative prices will be in the 2040s, especially tied specifically to China’s nuclear program.

Because the prediction is explicitly about outcomes “over the next couple of decades,” and we are only about three years past the prediction date, it is too early to determine whether the long‑term claims (400 nuclear plants/Reactors, < $0.05/kWh, and a resulting structural manufacturing advantage) will prove correct.

Therefore, the correct classification as of now is: it’s too early to tell, i.e., inconclusive.