E88: First principle politics, China chaos & outlook, state of private/public markets & more

Breaking the prediction into components:

1. JD Vance wins the Ohio U.S. Senate general election – This happened. In the November 8, 2022 election, Republican JD Vance defeated Democrat Tim Ryan 53.03% to 46.92% for the open Ohio Senate seat.(en.wikipedia.org)

2. Republicans experience a broad ‘red wave’ nationally in November 2022 – This did not occur. In the 2022 midterms, Republicans won only a narrow House majority while Democrats expanded their Senate majority by one seat; multiple post‑election analyses explicitly state that the widely anticipated “red wave did not materialize.”(en.wikipedia.org) Historically, the president’s party usually loses many more seats in midterms, so this outcome represented Democratic overperformance, not a Republican wave.

3. Blake Masters will win the Arizona GOP Senate primary and perform strongly in the November general election – This is mixed but overall contrary to the “do well”/“perform strongly” framing:

   • Masters did win the Republican primary for U.S. Senate in Arizona.(washingtonpost.com)
   • In the general election, however, he lost to Democratic incumbent Mark Kelly 51.4% to 46.5%.(ballotwire.com) Subsequent analyses note that Masters was the weakest‑performing statewide Republican candidate in Arizona and that he underperformed Trump’s 2020 margin, with one major outlet labeling him among the “worst candidates” of 2022.(en.wikipedia.org) That performance is hard to characterize as “doing well” or “strong.”

Because the prediction hinged on a broad red wave and a strong Blake Masters general‑election showing—both of which clearly failed—despite being partly correct about Vance’s win and Masters’s primary, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong.

The prediction said that during the 2021–2022 (117th) Congress, Senate Democratic leadership would not bring forward and pass legislation to codify Obergefell / provide federal protection for same-sex marriage before that Congress ended in early January 2023.

What actually happened:

• In response to concerns raised after the Dobbs decision and Justice Thomas’s concurrence, Congress advanced the Respect for Marriage Act (RFMA), H.R. 8404. The House first passed it on July 19, 2022. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The Senate then took it up and passed the bill on November 29, 2022, by a 61–36 vote, with 12 Republicans joining all Democrats, during the 117th Congress. (senate.gov)
• The House agreed to the Senate-amended bill on December 8, 2022, and President Biden signed it into law on December 13, 2022, still within the 117th Congress. (en.wikipedia.org)

Substance of the law:

• RFMA repeals the Defense of Marriage Act and requires the federal government and all states to recognize any marriage that is valid in the state where it was performed, explicitly covering same-sex and interracial marriages. This is widely described as "enshrining" or "protecting" marriage equality in federal law. (congress.gov)
• Legal and news analyses note that RFMA does not fully codify Obergefell in the sense of forcing every state to issue same-sex marriage licenses if the Supreme Court overturned Obergefell, but it does provide durable federal recognition and interstate recognition protections for same-sex marriages. (time.com)

How this maps to the prediction:

• The core falsifiable claim was that Democrats would not bring up and pass such legislation in the Senate while they had the chance in the 117th Congress. In reality, Senate Democratic leadership did exactly that by scheduling and passing the Respect for Marriage Act in November 2022, in coalition with sufficient Republican votes. (senate.gov)
• Even if one argues RFMA is not a perfect one-to-one codification of the Obergefell decision, it clearly is federal legislation whose central purpose is to protect same-sex marriage recognition nationwide and to backstop Obergefell at the statutory level. That directly contradicts the prediction that Democrats would decline to bring forward and pass such a bill when they had the opportunity.

Because the Senate did in fact bring forward and pass legislation providing federal protection for same-sex marriages in the 117th Congress, the prediction is wrong.

The prediction was that in the November 2022 U.S. midterm elections, the Republican Party would gain a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives for the next Congress.

Official election results and subsequent reporting confirm that Republicans won control of the House in the 2022 midterms, securing a narrow majority and thereby controlling the 118th Congress (which convened on January 3, 2023). Major outlets such as the Associated Press and others reported that Republicans passed the 218-seat threshold required for a majority, while Democrats retained control of the Senate.

Because the predicted event (GOP winning the House in the 2022 midterms and thus having the majority in the next Congress) clearly occurred, the prediction is right.

The prediction concerns China’s total population by the year 2100. As of today (2025), we are 75 years away from that date, so the prediction cannot yet be judged as right or wrong.

What we can say today:

• China’s population peaked around 2021–2022 at about 1.41–1.43 billion and has since begun to decline.
• The UN World Population Prospects 2022 projections show China’s population falling to roughly 0.77–0.80 billion by 2100, which is on the order of a ~45–50% decline from the peak. This matches the type of projection Chamath is referencing ("contracting by almost 50% by 2100").

However, these are projections, not outcomes. Demographic forecasts over such a long horizon (fertility, mortality, migration, policy changes) are uncertain and can change substantially. Until we actually reach 2100, we cannot definitively determine whether China’s population will have declined by ~50% from its current level.

Because the target year has not arrived, the correct status is inconclusive (too early to tell).

The prediction’s horizon is “over the next couple of decades” from a 2022 podcast, i.e., roughly the early‑to‑mid 2040s. As of the current date (late 2025), that time has not arrived, so we cannot yet say whether:

1. China will have built ~400 nuclear power plants (or reactors).

   • Public data today show China has on the order of a few dozen operating nuclear reactors and several dozen more under construction or planned, not hundreds of plants already built. Long‑term projections (e.g., Chinese policy targets and IAEA/OECD projections) discuss aggressive build‑out scenarios but do not establish what will actually be in place by the 2040s. These are future plans, not completed outcomes.

2. Chinese industrial electricity costs will fall below $0.05/kWh because of this build‑out.

   • Current industrial power prices in China vary by region and policy (including coal, renewables, and nuclear), and while some tariffs can approach or dip below $0.05/kWh in certain conditions, there is no definitive evidence yet that a nuclear‑driven large‑scale, sustained sub‑$0.05/kWh regime for industry has been locked in for the 2040s.

3. That will reliably give China a major cost advantage over U.S. manufacturing due specifically to electricity cost differentials of roughly $0.05 vs. $0.11–0.12/kWh.

   • U.S. industrial electricity prices and Chinese industrial prices both fluctuate with fuel costs, regulation, technology mix, and policy. It is not yet possible to verify what the relative prices will be in the 2040s, especially tied specifically to China’s nuclear program.

Because the prediction is explicitly about outcomes “over the next couple of decades,” and we are only about three years past the prediction date, it is too early to determine whether the long‑term claims (400 nuclear plants/Reactors, < $0.05/kWh, and a resulting structural manufacturing advantage) will prove correct.

Therefore, the correct classification as of now is: it’s too early to tell, i.e., inconclusive.

Timeframe. Amazon and One Medical announced that Amazon completed its acquisition of One Medical on February 22, 2023, via Business Wire and their own sites.(aboutamazon.com) The prediction window (“within a year after closing the deal”) therefore runs to February 22, 2024.

Baseline telehealth footprint before Amazon’s expansion. Before and at the time of closing, One Medical had on the order of ~790,000–836,000 members, with memberships including 24/7 virtual care via its app.(siliconangle.com) That’s the rough starting telehealth footprint Amazon was buying.

Expansion actions within one year.

• On February 22, 2023 (closing day), Amazon and One Medical immediately rolled out a national promotion: new U.S. customers could buy a One Medical membership for $144 for the first year (vs. the usual $199), marketed through Amazon and explicitly including 24/7 virtual care and access to offices in many cities.(aboutamazon.com) This was an early step in using Amazon’s channels to grow One Medical membership.
• The decisive move came on November 8, 2023, about 8.5 months after closing. Amazon and One Medical launched a new Prime benefit under which Prime members can add a One Medical membership for $9/month or $99/year, up to $100 off the regular fee. This benefit includes nationwide 24/7 on‑demand virtual care (video chats and app‑based “Treat Me Now” for common conditions) at no extra cost, and is marketed as a standard, easy add‑on for Prime accounts on Amazon’s site.(onemedical.com) That explicitly expands One Medical–style telehealth to Amazon’s mainstream customer base.

Scale relative to Amazon’s customer base. Analysts estimate that around 180 million people in the U.S. had Amazon Prime memberships by early 2024, roughly three‑quarters of U.S. consumers.(businessinsider.com) Making One Medical—previously a sub‑million‑member service—available as a discounted, prominently marketed telehealth membership to this enormous Prime base (plus up to five family members per subscriber) is a very large increase in its potential telehealth reach.

Additional context (beyond the 1‑year window). In June 2024, Amazon further folded its separate “Amazon Clinic” virtual‑care product into the Amazon One Medical brand as a pay‑per‑visit telehealth option, explicitly positioning One Medical as the umbrella for Amazon’s telehealth offerings.(aboutamazon.com) This reinforces the direction of travel but is not needed to satisfy the within‑one‑year criterion.

Assessment. Within one year of the deal closing, Amazon:

• Leveraged its e‑commerce platform to push discounted One Medical memberships with 24/7 virtual care; and
• Launched a deeply discounted, nationally available 24/7 telehealth membership as a Prime benefit to a ~180M‑member U.S. customer base.

Given the jump from <1M One Medical members to telehealth services being marketed as a mainstream Prime add‑on for tens of millions of Amazon customers, it is reasonable to say Amazon “massively” and significantly expanded One Medical’s telehealth footprint within a year of closing, in line with Friedberg’s prediction.

Evidence from 2022–2025 shows that the SEC did, in fact, embark on a multi‑year wave of enforcement actions against a wide range of crypto firms and related investment entities over tokens the agency characterizes as securities, producing substantial settlements and extended litigation.

Key points:

1. Sustained surge in SEC crypto enforcement (2022–2025)
   Independent analyses show that SEC crypto‑related enforcement actions hit a record high in 2023, with 46 actions—up 53% from 2022 and nearly double 2021. Monetary penalties against digital‑asset market participants totaled about $2.89 billion by the end of 2023, with $281.4 million in 2023 alone; the majority of cases involved unregistered securities offerings and related violations. (fortune.com)
   The SEC’s own FY 2023 enforcement summary highlights a “series of enforcement actions” targeting “rampant noncompliance in the crypto asset intermediary space,” naming platforms such as Beaxy, Bittrex, Binance, and Coinbase. (sec.gov)
   The SEC’s running list of crypto‑asset enforcement actions shows a steady cadence of new cases through late 2023 and 2024 (e.g., Kraken, BarnBridge DAO, ShapeShift AG, Abra/Plutus, various trading and mining schemes, and others), consistent with Jason’s “one firm after another” framing. (sec.gov)

2. Enforcement reaching investment/venture‑style crypto firms and related parties
   Jason’s prediction mentioned venture players and related parties. While the most high‑profile cases hit exchanges and issuers, the SEC did bring actions against crypto‑focused private funds and managers. A prominent example is Galois Capital Management LLC, a former registered investment adviser to a private fund that primarily invested in crypto assets. In 2024, the SEC charged Galois with custody violations involving “crypto assets being offered and sold as securities” and misleading investors about redemption terms; Galois agreed to a civil penalty as part of a settlement. (sec.gov)
   Combined with actions against DAOs (BarnBridge), DeFi projects, and centralized platforms that listed or structured products around tokens the SEC alleges are securities, this matches the spirit of going after the ecosystem of venture‑style and intermediary actors around such tokens, not only the token issuers themselves. (viewpoints.reedsmith.com)

3. "Massive settlements" did occur (often alongside or in addition to SEC actions)
   Within the 2022–2026 prediction window, there were multiple large monetary resolutions connected to crypto enforcement:

   • Kraken (Payward Ventures & Payward Trading) settled with the SEC in February 2023: it ended its U.S. staking‑as‑a‑service program and agreed to pay $30 million in disgorgement, interest, and penalties over allegations its staking program was an unregistered securities offering. (sec.gov)
   • BarnBridge DAO and its founders agreed in December 2023 to pay more than $1.7 million and shut down the DAO’s SMART Yield products, which the SEC characterized as unregistered structured crypto‑asset securities. (sec.gov)
   • In parallel, broader U.S. enforcement against Binance (DOJ, CFTC, Treasury) produced an enormous $4.3 billion global settlement in November 2023. While this was not an SEC case, it occurred alongside—and in the shadow of—an SEC civil suit alleging securities‑law violations by Binance and its founder, underscoring the “massive settlements plus SEC litigation” environment Jason described. (cftc.gov)

4. Multi‑year litigation over whether many tokens are securities
   From late 2022 onward, multiple SEC suits over token‑as‑security theories have dragged on for years:

   • The SEC’s longstanding case against Ripple (filed 2020) continued to generate key rulings in 2023 and beyond and remained active into the prediction window. (ccn.com)
   • The SEC sued Coinbase and Binance in 2023, alleging they operated as unregistered securities exchanges and listed numerous tokens the SEC claims are unregistered securities; those cases proceeded through extensive motion practice and, for Binance, a 2024 ruling allowing most of the SEC’s claims to go forward. (sec.gov)
   • As of early 2025, analyses still list multiple ongoing SEC crypto lawsuits—Ripple, Kraken, Cumberland DRW, Pulsechain—plus several open investigations, even as the agency begins to retreat from some cases under new leadership. (coindesk.com)
     This pattern of overlapping cases running for years (often initiated 2020–2023 and still unresolved by 2025) fits Jason’s forecast of “three or four years of litigation.”

5. Timing vs. prediction window
   Jason spoke in July 2022 about the next 3–4 years (roughly 2022–2025/26). We are now in November 2025, more than three years into that window. The record‑setting wave of crypto enforcement actions in 2022–2024, the substantial settlements, and the fact that several high‑impact cases remain active in 2025 collectively show that this prolonged enforcement‑and‑litigation cycle did materialize within the predicted timeframe. (fortune.com)

Caveat: The normalized version of the prediction (explicitly emphasizing traditional “venture firms”) is somewhat narrower than Jason’s original wording, and truly marquee SEC cases against name‑brand Sand Hill Road VC funds have not (as of late 2025) been a central feature of the crackdown. But taken in context—SEC going after a broad array of crypto firms, funds, DAOs, and intermediaries with token‑as‑security theories, producing big settlements and drawn‑out litigation over several years—the core substance of his forecast has clearly played out. Hence the prediction is best judged as right, albeit directionally rather than perfectly precise on which specific types of firms would be most in the crosshairs.