ALL INPredictions
Last updated Nov 29, 2025
Prediction
Friedberg
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Friedberg @ 01:31:17Inconclusive
politicseconomy
Starting in the early 2020s, the joint alignment of China and Russia marks the beginning of a long-term decline in U.S. global cultural and economic dominance, with U.S. dominance measurably reduced over the subsequent decade.
This is the beginning of the end of US cultural and economic influence globally, or dominance rather influence it, uh, globally.View on YouTube
Explanation

As of November 30, 2025, only about three years have passed since the February 2022 prediction, which framed the Xi–Putin alignment as the beginning of a long‑term decline in U.S. cultural and economic dominance over roughly a decade. That horizon has not elapsed, so it’s too early to decisively score the prediction.

On the economic side, current data do not yet show a clear decline in U.S. dominance:

  • IMF‑based estimates indicate the U.S. share of world GDP (nominal) has risen from around 25% in 2020 to roughly 26–27% by 2024–2025, while China is still significantly smaller in nominal terms. (progressivepolicy.org)
  • The U.S. dollar remains the primary reserve currency, accounting for about 57–58% of disclosed global FX reserves in 2024–2025—down only modestly from earlier levels, and still far ahead of the euro and yuan. (leap-insights.org)

On the cultural/soft‑power side, evidence also shows continued U.S. dominance rather than a clear downturn:

  • The U.S. is ranked #1 in Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index in 2023, 2024, and 2025, with record high scores in 2024–2025, leading in overall influence and many cultural and scientific attributes. (brandfinance.com)
  • China has risen to the #2 position in soft power, which supports the idea of a more multipolar environment, but this is growth in others’ influence rather than a confirmed structural collapse of U.S. dominance. (internationalinvestment.biz)

There are signs consistent with the direction of the prediction—e.g., gradual diversification away from the dollar, China’s growing economic and soft‑power weight, and tighter China–Russia/BRICS alignment—but these developments so far amount to incremental multipolarization, not a clearly measurable end of U.S. dominance.

Because:

  1. The claimed timeframe (a structural decline over the 2020s) has not yet played out, and
  2. Current quantitative indicators still show the U.S. at or near peak economic and soft‑power strength,

the fairest assessment at this point is “inconclusive” rather than clearly right or wrong.