Evidence since 2022 clearly shows that the US and its allies have elevated sanctions and other economic tools, and have begun to frame “economic security” and economic statecraft much more centrally in formal strategies.

• Doctrines and toolkits have shifted toward economic statecraft.

  • The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy and follow‑on policy speeches emphasize modernizing export controls, investment screening (including possible outbound investment controls), and other economic measures to protect technology and shape geopolitical outcomes, integrating these tools into core national security planning. (studylib.net)
  • A 2023 US Senate hearing explicitly framed sanctions, export controls, and investment screening as key instruments “advancing national security and foreign policy,” and highlighted that the response to Russia’s invasion “centered” on these tools in coordination with allies. (congress.gov)
  • The UK’s 2023 Integrated Review Refresh introduces an Economic Deterrence Initiative aimed at strengthening sanctions implementation and enforcement and describes new economic‑security measures (critical minerals, semiconductor strategy, supply‑chain and investment protections) as part of its national security posture. (gov.uk)
  • The EU’s 2023 European Economic Security Strategy explicitly addresses risks from the “weaponisation of economic dependencies” and economic coercion, and outlines a toolkit of FDI screening, export controls, anti‑coercion measures, and (now) outbound‑investment scrutiny as part of a new economic‑security framework. Analysts note this is a significant step for an EU that previously tended to keep economics and security separate. (eeas.europa.eu)
  • Think‑tank assessments describe the Russia sanctions response as creating “new precedents for economic statecraft”—including coordinated blocking of Russian central‑bank reserves and sweeping export controls—indicating a qualitative shift in how Western governments use economic levers as core tools in crisis response. (atlanticcouncil.org)

• Corporate and CSR‑driven pressure has indeed become a major (if partly informal) pillar.

  • Following the invasion, more than 1,000 global companies curtailed or withdrew operations from Russia; Yale’s CELI list and similar trackers were explicitly used as reputational and CSR pressure tools to push firms to exit, and are often cited as part of the broader “sanctions” environment rather than purely private choices. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Ukraine’s International Sponsors of War list was designed as a non‑legal but reputational instrument to stigmatize companies still doing business with Russia and thereby reduce Moscow’s fiscal and technological capacity—again entwining corporate behavior with allied economic‑pressure campaigns. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • Academic and market analyses find that companies which fully exited Russia tended to be rewarded in terms of investor perceptions, stakeholder trust, and reputational standing, reinforcing CSR‑based incentives to align with sanctions and political pressure. (corpgov.law.harvard.edu)

• However, calling this a fundamental rewrite driven by “effectiveness of sanctions + CSR” goes beyond what the evidence can cleanly establish.

  • Long before 2022, US foreign policy was already heavily sanction‑centric. A Bush Center analysis notes that between 2000 and 2021 the US sanctioned more than 9,000 individuals and entities, and that nearly 5,000 more were added after the 2022 invasion—arguing the US already relied “excessively” on sanctions and export controls, and needs to diversify its tools. This suggests a strong continuity of a sanctions‑heavy approach, even if 2022–25 marked an escalation and systematization rather than a wholly new doctrine. (bushcenter.org)
  • Senior US officials now talk about “restrictive economic statecraft” becoming more common, but also explicitly insist sanctions should be used sparingly and as a “force multiplier,” not a stand‑alone strategy—indicating that, in doctrine, they remain one set of tools among many rather than the sole organizing principle of foreign policy. (bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov)
  • The UK government explicitly characterizes its 2023 integrated review changes as an “evolution not a revolution”, even as it adds new economic‑deterrence measures, which cuts against the claim of a fully “rewritten” playbook. (gov.uk)
  • Corporate behavior is mixed: although hundreds of major brands have exited Russia, studies and official data show that most foreign firms have not fully left and that nearly 2,000 multinationals still operating in Russia paid over $20 billion in taxes in 2023, materially supporting its budget. That indicates CSR‑driven pressure is powerful but far from universally decisive. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • There is also substantial debate over how effective the Russia sanctions have been. Congressional testimony and think‑tank work point out that Russia’s economy shrank far less than early Western predictions and has adapted in important ways, even as sanctions constrained specific sectors like advanced technology. This makes it hard to say that clear, widely perceived “effectiveness” of sanctions alone has driven a wholesale doctrinal rewrite. (congress.gov)

Because:

• economic tools and coordinated sanctions have clearly become more structured, prominent, and institutionally embedded in US/EU/UK strategies since 2022;
• but sanctions were already central before the war, with current officials and documents often framing changes as incremental “evolution,” not a brand‑new doctrine; and
• the role of corporate/CSR‑driven pressure is large but only partially formalized in official foreign‑policy “doctrines,” with uneven corporate participation and controversial assessments of sanctions’ effectiveness,

it is ultimately a judgment call whether the foreign‑policy “playbook” has been “fundamentally rewritten” in the precise way Chamath describes. Reasonable analysts can marshal evidence both for a significant shift and for strong continuity.

Given that this hinges on qualitative interpretation of phrases like “fundamentally rewritten” and on contested assessments of sanctions’ effectiveness and corporate behavior, the prediction cannot be scored as clearly right or clearly wrong on the available evidence. Hence the result is best classified as ambiguous.