As of November 30, 2025, there has been no Chinese military invasion of Taiwan. The situation is characterized instead by ongoing coercion, military exercises, and preparations on both sides.

Evidence:

• The Council on Foreign Relations’ Global Conflict Tracker describes the Taiwan situation as an ongoing confrontation and source of “heightened military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait,” but does not report that China has initiated an invasion or war to seize the island. (cfr.org)
• China has conducted large-scale, increasingly aggressive military drills around Taiwan—e.g., the Joint Sword-2024 exercises (May and October 2024) and large 2025 exercises around Taiwan and its offshore islands—but these are explicitly described as drills and coercive shows of force, not an actual invasion or attempt to occupy Taiwan. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Analyses in 2025 from think tanks and military observers focus on China’s capability-building and intimidation (e.g., amphibious capability, airborne forces, new landing barges) and on whether China might invade by 2027, making clear that such an invasion remains hypothetical and risky rather than something that has occurred. (taipeitimes.com)

Chamath’s prediction was that, after seeing the consequences of Western sanctions on Russia, a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan would effectively be “off the table” as a realistic option for the foreseeable future. Over the 3½ years since March 2022, China has not chosen to invade, despite:

• Growing military capabilities and preparations aimed at Taiwan. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Strong political rhetoric and explicit refusal to rule out the use of force. (reuters.com)

We cannot directly observe internal CCP decision-making, so we can’t prove that invasion is literally “off the table” in their minds. However, the falsifiable part of the claim—that China would not actually invade in the near-to-medium term following Russia’s sanctions experience—has, up to late 2025, been borne out by events.

Given that:

• Sufficient time (over three years) has passed to test the “foreseeable future” horizon reasonably,
• No invasion has occurred, and
• The main observable implication of the prediction (restraint from invasion despite pressure and capability growth) matches reality,

I classify the prediction outcome as right under the information available as of November 30, 2025.