Chamath’s conditional forecast was that widespread excess inventory plus difficulty obtaining working capital would lead to a “pretty bad recession” in the subsequent period (roughly late 2022–2023).

1. Antecedent condition (inventory glut) largely happened

Retailers did end up with very large excess inventories after the supply‑chain chaos of 2020–21:

• U.S. retailers’ inventories rose by about $78 billion in 2022 to ~$740 billion, roughly a 12% increase, leaving many with an “inventory glut” that required markdowns, warehousing, and order cuts.(mckinsey.com)
• Major chains like Target, Walmart, Gap, Kohl’s, Dick’s Sporting Goods, etc. reported inventory up far more than sales (e.g., Target +43% YoY inventory) and saw margins and profits squeezed as they discounted and canceled orders.(esaroi.com)

So the premise that companies ended up with too much inventory and related working‑capital strain was broadly correct in sectors like retail and apparel.

2. But the predicted macro outcome (a “pretty bad recession” in 2022–23) did not occur

For the U.S. economy—the context of the All‑In conversation—the data show a slowdown but continued expansion, not a significant recession:

• Real U.S. GDP grew, not contracted: BEA estimates show real GDP up 1.9% in 2022 and 2.5% in 2023, with Q4‑to‑Q4 real growth of 3.1% from 2022 to 2023.(bea.gov)
• The unemployment rate returned to and stayed near pre‑pandemic lows. BLS analysis notes unemployment back near its pre‑COVID level in 2022 and still only 3.8% in Q4 2023, with the labor market described as “strong.”(bls.gov)
• The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee, which is the standard arbiter of U.S. recessions, shows the last recession ending in April 2020; its list of announcements has no new peak or trough after that, meaning the period through 2023 is treated as an ongoing expansion, not a new recession.(nber.org)

Globally, major institutions also characterized 2023 as a marked slowdown but not a global recession. The OECD, for example, projected weak growth in 2023 (around 2.2%) and emphasized that its central scenario was “not a global recession,” with the U.S. and euro area slowing but still growing.(marmomacchineinternational.com)

3. Sectoral pain vs. macro recession

Excess inventories and higher rates did pressure company balance sheets and profits: retailers slashed prices, canceled billions in orders, and faced higher warehousing and capital costs.(rhsmith.umd.edu) But these stresses remained sector‑specific and did not propagate into a broad, deep, and prolonged contraction in output and employment of the kind conventionally labeled a “pretty bad recession.”

Because the key consequence Chamath described—a significant recession in the subsequent period—did not materialize in 2022–23 despite the inventory issues, the prediction is best classified as wrong.