Timeframe and core claim
Chamath was talking about the "near term" (roughly the next couple of years after August 2022). His scenario had several linked elements: (1) recurring geopolitical/economic shocks destabilizing markets, (2) a U.S. consumer‑credit "implosion", (3) Bolsonaro trying to take over Brazil after losing, and (4) a persistently inflationary, fragmented world that requires higher rates to normalize. Some of these materialized, others clearly did not, so the overall prediction is mixed rather than cleanly right or wrong.

1. Bolsonaro “will try to take over Brazil”
After losing the October 2022 election, Bolsonaro’s supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace on January 8, 2023, in an event widely described by officials and media as a coup attempt/insurrection aimed at overturning Lula’s victory. Subsequent investigations have labeled Bolsonaro the intellectual author of a “wilful and premeditated coup attempt,” and Brazil’s Supreme Court has since convicted him over plotting to keep himself in power. (en.wikipedia.org)
This part of the prediction is essentially correct.

2. “Consumer credit thing will implode”
U.S. consumer credit has clearly come under stress, but not an outright implosion:

• New York Fed data show household debt rising steadily, with credit‑card and auto‑loan balances at record levels and delinquency rates climbing, especially among younger and lower‑income borrowers. However, overall delinquency rates are described as elevated but still low by historical standards and largely contained. (newyorkfed.org)
• There have been sector‑specific problems (e.g., bankruptcies of a subprime auto lender and rising auto repossessions), but these have not triggered a systemic consumer‑credit meltdown akin to 2008. (theguardian.com)
  So the direction (mounting credit stress) was right, but the magnitude (“implode” and broadly tilt global markets) has not occurred.

3. Repeated “whack‑a‑mole” shocks destabilizing markets
Since late 2022 there have indeed been successive geopolitical and economic shocks—Ukraine war aftershocks, the 2023 Israel‑Hamas war, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, and new tariff and trade conflicts—all of which created bouts of volatility and higher shipping and trade costs. (reuters.com)
However, global equity markets were not persistently destabilized in the sense of sustained weakness:

• The MSCI World Index returned about +24% in 2023 and +19% in 2024, after a big drop in 2022. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The S&P 500 fell about 19% in 2022, but then gained ~24% in 2023 and ~23% in 2024, reaching record highs by October 2025. (en.wikipedia.org)
  Markets experienced episodes of turbulence (e.g., regional‑bank scares, credit concerns) but, in aggregate, they rallied strongly instead of being continually “tilted” down by each new shock. So this aspect is only partially borne out.

4. “Inflationary, fragmented” world that “takes higher interest rates to normalize”

• The Fed raised rates aggressively from near zero in early 2022 to 5.25–5.50% by July 2023, keeping them high through 2024 before only beginning to ease in 2025. (forbes.com)
• U.S. and global inflation did not stay very high: U.S. inflation fell from around 9% in mid‑2022 to roughly the 3% range by 2024–25, and the IMF reports global headline inflation declining steadily toward central‑bank targets, though still above pre‑COVID norms. (usinflationcalculator.com)
• At the same time, major institutions repeatedly emphasize that high policy rates and geopolitical tensions are weighing on growth and trade, reflecting a somewhat more fragmented, risk‑prone global environment than in the pre‑2020 era. (imf.org)
  So he was right that the environment would require and sustain higher interest rates for longer and would be more fragmented, but wrong that inflation itself would remain stubbornly high; instead, the story has been disinflation under tight policy.

Overall assessment

• Correct: Bolsonaro‑linked coup attempt; higher‑for‑longer rates and a more fragmented, shock‑prone global backdrop.
• Overstated / Incorrect: A true U.S. consumer‑credit “implosion” and global markets being durably “tilted” by each crisis—equities instead entered a powerful bull market after 2022 despite these shocks.

Because some central elements came true while others clearly did not—and because the prediction bundles several distinct claims that cut in opposite directions—the fairest classification is “ambiguous” rather than purely right or wrong.