E90: Twitter subpoenas, market overview, Pelosi's Taiwan visit & more

Jason was describing the level of U.S. job openings (JOLTS), which were "finally dipped under 11 million" and around 10–11 million at the time of the August 2022 episode. He then projected that they would shed about 300–400k per month over the next year, taking openings "down to maybe 5 or 6" million.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics JOLTS data, total nonfarm job openings in August 2022 were about 10.2 million on a seasonally adjusted basis.

• The BLS Monthly Labor Review chart shows 10.198 million job openings in August 2022. (bls.gov)
• The contemporaneous JOLTS release similarly reports 10.1 million job openings at the end of August 2022. (bls.gov)

One year later, job openings were still close to 9–10 million, not 5–6 million:

• The BLS JOLTS news release for August 2023 reports that job openings increased to about 9.6 million. (bls.gov)
• A later BLS table of seasonally adjusted series (TED: The Economics Daily) lists 9.287 million job openings in August 2023. (bls.gov)

Using these official figures, openings fell from roughly 10.2 million (Aug 2022) to about 9.3 million (Aug 2023), a decline of only ~0.9 million over 12 months—about 75k per month on average, far below the predicted 300–400k per month. And the level in August 2023 remained almost double the predicted 5–6 million.

Because both the magnitude of the monthly decline and the end-of-period level were far off, the prediction is wrong.

Chamath said that from the earlier 2022 market lows, the S&P 500 would rally to roughly the 4,000–4,300 range. The S&P 500 made a major local low in June 2022 around 3,636.87. It then rallied above 4,000 in July and, on August 16, 2022, reached an intraday high of 4,325.28 and closed at 4,305.20, squarely within and at the top of his projected band. (statmuse.com) Given that this rally occurred soon after those lows, the prediction that the index would move into the 4,000–4,300 zone was borne out.

Evidence from October–November 2022 shows that energy supply and pricing were indeed at the center of geopolitical and national security debates, closely tied to the Ukraine war, as Chamath predicted.

• In October 2022 Russia launched a large missile and drone campaign specifically targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, knocking out around half of the country’s power grid by mid‑November. This created mass blackouts and was widely framed as a deliberate strategy in the war, putting energy systems squarely at the heart of security discussions. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The same period saw knock‑on crises in neighboring states: Moldova suffered its worst energy crisis since independence in late 2022 after Gazprom cut gas supplies and Ukraine halted electricity exports due to Russian attacks on its grid, a situation described as a major national emergency directly linked to the war. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In the United States, President Biden used October 18–19, 2022 speeches and fact sheets to announce additional releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve explicitly framed as actions to strengthen U.S. energy security and respond to "Putin’s price hike" in fuel costs—showing energy prices and supply as central domestic and security issues on the eve of the midterms. (bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov)
• Throughout November 2022, G7 and EU governments were intensely negotiating the design and level of a price cap on Russian seaborne oil, explicitly intended to reduce Moscow’s ability to finance the invasion of Ukraine while avoiding global oil price spikes. This made energy policy the main lever in sanctions strategy and a core topic in high‑level security deliberations. (euronews.com)
• In October 2022 OPEC+ announced a large oil production cut, widely interpreted as aiding Russia. President Biden vowed “consequences” and said the U.S. would re‑evaluate its relationship with Saudi Arabia, highlighting how oil production decisions were being treated as matters of foreign policy alignment and national security, not just economics. (en.wikipedia.org)
• More broadly, analyses of the 2021–2023 global energy crisis document that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine turned an existing supply crunch into a full‑blown energy emergency, with record gas and power prices, EU emergency measures, and widespread European protests over energy‑driven inflation in October 2022—indicating that energy affordability and security were central to political conflict across the continent. (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, these developments show that by October–November 2022, energy supply and pricing were again (and arguably still) the main focus and "tip of the spear" in debates about the Ukraine war, sanctions, and broader national security concerns, aligning well with Chamath’s forecast.

Evidence from the inflation and rate paths lines up with Chamath’s forecast.

• CPI above 5%: U.S. headline CPI ran well above 5% through 2021–2022, peaking at 9.1% year‑over‑year in June 2022 and remaining elevated into early 2023. (usinflationcalculator.com)
• CPI falls below 5%: CPI first fell back under 5% in April 2023, printing 4.9% year‑over‑year (the first sub‑5% reading since June 2021). (cnbc.com)
• Fed funds path: The Fed began hiking in March 2022 and kept raising its target range until it reached 4.75–5.00% at the March 22, 2023 FOMC meeting, then 5.00–5.25% in May and ultimately 5.25–5.50% in July 2023. (forbes.com)

By the time inflation dropped below 5% (April 2023), the federal funds target range already had an upper bound of 5.0%, i.e., mid‑single digits and roughly double the pre‑hiking “equilibrium” assumption around 2.5%. This matches the core of Chamath’s prediction: that, given CPI had run above 5%, the Fed would ultimately have to lift rates up to roughly the CPI level (mid‑single digits) to get inflation back under 5%. While we can’t prove this level was strictly necessary in a causal sense, the actual policy path and timing of inflation’s decline are consistent with what he said would need to happen, so the prediction is best classified as right.

Evidence since the August 2022 episode lines up well with Chamath’s outlined regime: higher rates, higher inflation and costs than the pre‑2020 globalization era, alongside continued (but slower) growth.

1. Higher and sustained interest rates vs. the 2010s:
   From 2010–2019 the effective federal funds rate was typically near 0–2.5%, averaging around the low‑1% range. Since the 2022 hiking cycle, the annual effective rate has been 1.69% (2022), 5.03% (2023), and 5.14% (2024), with the target range still 3.75–4.00% as of late 2025—well above the 2010s norm. This is a multi‑year shift to structurally higher policy rates compared with the pre‑COVID decade. (ycharts.com)

2. Inflation and input costs above the pre‑COVID norm:
   Core PCE inflation in the U.S. averaged roughly 1.5–1.7% in the 2010s; since 2021 it has been materially higher: 3.6% (2021), 5.3% (2022), 4.2% (2023), and 2.9% (2024). Headline PCE shows a similar pattern, with 2021–24 all above the 2010s average even after the initial spike faded. (ycharts.com)
   Price levels for many inputs (energy, key commodities, labor, and capital) remain structurally higher than in the 2010s; even as inflation has cooled toward 2–3%, it has settled at levels modestly above the old regime rather than snapping back to sub‑2% dynamics.

3. Deglobalization / national‑security supply‑chain shift is real:
   IMF and BIS work document “geoeconomic fragmentation”: a sharp rise in trade‑restricting measures since late 2010s, trade and FDI flows re‑routing along geopolitical lines, and friend‑shoring/near‑shoring away from China toward countries like Mexico, Vietnam and India. (imf.org)
   Federal Reserve research on U.S. FDI finds outward investment and advanced‑manufacturing activity shifting from China/Hong Kong to allies and some evidence of reshoring into high‑tech U.S. manufacturing. (federalreserve.gov)
   Domestically, U.S. manufacturing construction has surged to record levels—over 10% of total construction spending—driven explicitly by supply‑chain security, CHIPS/IRA incentives, and corporate “de‑risking,” consistent with a costlier, security‑focused production structure. (seekingalpha.com)

4. Growth: positive but weaker relative to the hyper‑globalization era:
   U.S. real GDP growth since 2022 has remained positive—about 2.5% (2022), 2.9% (2023), 2.8% (2024), with projections around ~2% for 2025—so the economy has avoided recession and continued expanding. (en.wikipedia.org)
   However, the World Bank and others judge the 2020s on track to be the weakest decade for global growth since the 1960s, largely due to elevated trade tensions and fragmentation, implying “less growth” globally compared with the 1990s–2000s hyper‑globalization era. (theguardian.com)

5. Assessment against the exact claim:

• “Higher interest rates” than the pre‑2020 era: clearly true for 2022–25, with a multi‑year step‑up in policy rates and bond yields.
• “Higher inflation and input costs” relative to the 2010s: also borne out—post‑COVID inflation has declined from its peaks but has remained above the old ~1.5% core PCE norm, with higher labor, energy, and capital costs embedded in the system.
• “Less growth, but still sustained growth”: global forecasts and realized data show slower (though still positive) growth relative to earlier globalization decades; the U.S. itself has had solid growth so far but is projected to slow into the low‑2% range as higher rates and tariffs bite. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Deglobalization / security‑driven reshoring as a driver: empirical work and policy moves (tariffs, CHIPS Act, FDI re‑routing) confirm that national‑security and resilience concerns are materially reshaping supply chains in the direction he described.

It’s still early to declare a permanent new macro regime, but over the 2022–2025 window—the “coming years” he referenced—the combination of deglobalization pressures with persistently higher rates, higher inflation than the 2010s, elevated input costs, and continued (but less buoyant) growth matches his forecast closely. Hence the prediction is best judged as right given the evidence to date.

Timeframe and core claim
Chamath was talking about the "near term" (roughly the next couple of years after August 2022). His scenario had several linked elements: (1) recurring geopolitical/economic shocks destabilizing markets, (2) a U.S. consumer‑credit "implosion", (3) Bolsonaro trying to take over Brazil after losing, and (4) a persistently inflationary, fragmented world that requires higher rates to normalize. Some of these materialized, others clearly did not, so the overall prediction is mixed rather than cleanly right or wrong.

1. Bolsonaro “will try to take over Brazil”
After losing the October 2022 election, Bolsonaro’s supporters stormed Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace on January 8, 2023, in an event widely described by officials and media as a coup attempt/insurrection aimed at overturning Lula’s victory. Subsequent investigations have labeled Bolsonaro the intellectual author of a “wilful and premeditated coup attempt,” and Brazil’s Supreme Court has since convicted him over plotting to keep himself in power. (en.wikipedia.org)
This part of the prediction is essentially correct.

2. “Consumer credit thing will implode”
U.S. consumer credit has clearly come under stress, but not an outright implosion:

• New York Fed data show household debt rising steadily, with credit‑card and auto‑loan balances at record levels and delinquency rates climbing, especially among younger and lower‑income borrowers. However, overall delinquency rates are described as elevated but still low by historical standards and largely contained. (newyorkfed.org)
• There have been sector‑specific problems (e.g., bankruptcies of a subprime auto lender and rising auto repossessions), but these have not triggered a systemic consumer‑credit meltdown akin to 2008. (theguardian.com)
  So the direction (mounting credit stress) was right, but the magnitude (“implode” and broadly tilt global markets) has not occurred.

3. Repeated “whack‑a‑mole” shocks destabilizing markets
Since late 2022 there have indeed been successive geopolitical and economic shocks—Ukraine war aftershocks, the 2023 Israel‑Hamas war, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, and new tariff and trade conflicts—all of which created bouts of volatility and higher shipping and trade costs. (reuters.com)
However, global equity markets were not persistently destabilized in the sense of sustained weakness:

• The MSCI World Index returned about +24% in 2023 and +19% in 2024, after a big drop in 2022. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The S&P 500 fell about 19% in 2022, but then gained ~24% in 2023 and ~23% in 2024, reaching record highs by October 2025. (en.wikipedia.org)
  Markets experienced episodes of turbulence (e.g., regional‑bank scares, credit concerns) but, in aggregate, they rallied strongly instead of being continually “tilted” down by each new shock. So this aspect is only partially borne out.

4. “Inflationary, fragmented” world that “takes higher interest rates to normalize”

• The Fed raised rates aggressively from near zero in early 2022 to 5.25–5.50% by July 2023, keeping them high through 2024 before only beginning to ease in 2025. (forbes.com)
• U.S. and global inflation did not stay very high: U.S. inflation fell from around 9% in mid‑2022 to roughly the 3% range by 2024–25, and the IMF reports global headline inflation declining steadily toward central‑bank targets, though still above pre‑COVID norms. (usinflationcalculator.com)
• At the same time, major institutions repeatedly emphasize that high policy rates and geopolitical tensions are weighing on growth and trade, reflecting a somewhat more fragmented, risk‑prone global environment than in the pre‑2020 era. (imf.org)
  So he was right that the environment would require and sustain higher interest rates for longer and would be more fragmented, but wrong that inflation itself would remain stubbornly high; instead, the story has been disinflation under tight policy.

Overall assessment

• Correct: Bolsonaro‑linked coup attempt; higher‑for‑longer rates and a more fragmented, shock‑prone global backdrop.
• Overstated / Incorrect: A true U.S. consumer‑credit “implosion” and global markets being durably “tilted” by each crisis—equities instead entered a powerful bull market after 2022 despite these shocks.

Because some central elements came true while others clearly did not—and because the prediction bundles several distinct claims that cut in opposite directions—the fairest classification is “ambiguous” rather than purely right or wrong.