Available evidence since mid‑2021 supports Chamath’s core claim that new U.S. nuclear projects would not move rapidly into deployment and would remain hampered by slow, complex regulatory processes (and related political/legal fights), especially when compared with much faster builds abroad.

Key points:

1. No rapid new‑build cycle in the U.S.; Vogtle 3 & 4 illustrate very long timelines

   • The only new U.S. reactors to enter operation since the prediction are Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia. Unit 3 began commercial operation on July 31, 2023; Unit 4 entered commercial service in May 2024. Construction of these AP1000 units began in 2013, with regulatory approval expecting an in‑service date of 2016, but completion slipped to 2023–24 and costs roughly doubled to more than $30 billion.(nucnet.org)
   • IAEA‑based analysis cited by ABC News shows recent U.S. reactors (Comanche Peak‑2, Watts Bar‑1 and ‑2, Vogtle‑3 and ‑4) had average construction times of ~16.5 years from first concrete to grid connection, even before pre‑construction licensing and planning are counted.(abc.net.au)
   • By contrast, the World Nuclear Industry Status Reports and other analyses find Chinese reactors completed in the 2010s–2020s have average construction times of ~6 years from first concrete to grid connection, with some faster, and 39 of 66 global reactors started up 2013–22 were in China.(worldnuclearreport.org)
   • As of May 2024, after Vogtle‑4 entered commercial operation, no other nuclear power reactors were under construction in the U.S.(theuncontained.com) This is inconsistent with any notion of “rapid deployment” on 2–3‑year cycles.

2. Regulatory/bureaucratic timelines remain long and uncertain for new designs

   • The Government Accountability Office / EIA‑based summary notes that planning, licensing and building a nuclear plant in the U.S. typically takes 10–12 years in total, with NRC licensing alone expected to consume about four years but in practice often longer; NuScale’s first SMR design certification took almost six years.(nasdaq.com)
   • The NRC outright denied Oklo’s Aurora advanced micro‑reactor combined license application in January 2022 for “failure to supply information” on safety and accident analysis, ending the review without prejudice but underscoring how demanding and time‑consuming the process is for first‑of‑a‑kind designs.(cnbc.com)
   • Industry and legal analyses explicitly describe NRC procedures for advanced reactors as outdated and in need of modernization, reflecting a perception that regulatory processes are a serious bottleneck.(cnbc.com)

3. Flagship SMR deployment efforts stalled after years of development

   • The Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP), intended to be the first NuScale SMR plant at Idaho National Laboratory, received a DOE cost‑share award of up to $1.4 billion and had a notional schedule of construction starting mid‑decade and operation by ~2029–30.(energy.gov)
   • After about a decade of work, UAMPS and NuScale mutually agreed in November 2023 to terminate the CFPP, citing insufficient subscription from municipal utilities and sharply rising cost estimates (from ~$58/MWh to ~$89/MWh).(nuscalepower.com) The project was still only approaching a Combined License Application filing; no concrete had been poured.
   • While the immediate cause was economics and customer appetite, the outcome still matches Chamath’s broader point: even heavily supported first‑of‑a‑kind projects are not progressing quickly to construction, let alone to 2–3‑year build timelines.

4. Litigation and political opposition continue to complicate nuclear‑related projects

   • Spent‑fuel storage facilities—critical to the nuclear ecosystem—have been embroiled in prolonged litigation and state‑federal conflict. The Fifth Circuit vacated the NRC’s license for a private interim storage facility in Texas in 2023; in 2025 the Supreme Court ruled Texas lacked standing in that case, even as New Mexico’s governor and legislature pursued measures to block a similar Holtec facility.(axios.com)
   • Holtec ultimately canceled its planned HI‑STORE consolidated interim storage facility in New Mexico in October 2025, citing an “untenable path forward” for used‑fuel storage in that state after sustained political and legal resistance.(ans.org)
   • These fights are not about new power reactors per se, but they confirm Chamath’s claim that nuclear infrastructure in the U.S. remains vulnerable to being “bogged down” in litigation and regulatory/political hurdles.

5. Recent attempts to streamline regulation are a reaction to, not a refutation of, those delays

   • In 2025, new executive orders directed that advanced‑reactor licenses be reviewed within 18 months and moved some approval authority from the independent NRC to the Department of Energy, explicitly framed as an effort to speed approvals and reduce bureaucratic delay.(apnews.com)
   • These reforms are very recent and no reactors have yet been sited, built, and operated under this regime; they underscore that policymakers themselves see existing licensing as too slow.

Bottom line:
From mid‑2021 to late 2025, the U.S. did not achieve anything close to China‑style 2–3‑year nuclear build times. Instead, its only new reactors (Vogtle 3 & 4) exemplified decade‑long construction and huge overruns; advanced designs have faced long, uncertain licensing; a flagship SMR deployment was abandoned after a decade of preparatory work; and nuclear‑related projects like waste storage remain mired in legal and political disputes. Regulatory and bureaucratic processes are widely recognized as a major part of this drag.

Given that Chamath’s prediction was directional—nuclear progress would be slowed and obstructed enough to prevent rapid deployment comparable to China—the outcomes to date align with his statement, even though economics and project‑management issues also play important roles alongside litigation and bureaucracy.