Evidence from fall 2024 does not match Chamath’s prediction of a broad-based wave of revenue misses and a clearly weaker macro backdrop than mid‑2024.

1. Earnings/revenues in fall 2024

• For Q2 2024 (mid‑2024 baseline), about 59–60% of S&P 500 companies beat revenue estimates, with ~5% year‑over‑year revenue growth and 10 of 11 sectors growing revenues. This was already described as the 15th consecutive quarter of S&P 500 revenue growth. (insight.factset.com)
• In Q3 2024 (the key “fall” earnings season), FactSet shows about 59–61% of S&P 500 companies reporting revenues above estimates, aggregate revenues ~1–1.5% above expectations, and 5.2% year‑over‑year revenue growth, marking the 16th consecutive quarter of revenue growth. Nine of eleven sectors had positive revenue growth. (insight.factset.com)
• A separate LSEG/I/B/E/S summary likewise finds that by late November 2024, ~60.6% of S&P 500 firms beat revenue forecasts, with revenues overall 1.5% above estimates. (exante.eu)
• Goldman Sachs’ review of Q3 2024 earnings concludes that “overall, earnings were better than expected”, not characterized by widespread top‑line misses. (marcus.com)
  Taken together, the data show a majority of large U.S. companies still beating revenue estimates in fall 2024, with continued revenue growth across most sectors—not the “broad‑based revenue misses” the prediction called for.

2. Consumer strength vs. “really under pressure”

• Macroeconomic data show the U.S. economy remained solid in late 2024. Real GDP grew 2.8% annualized in Q3 2024 and 2.3% in Q4 2024, both above typical pre‑pandemic trend. (apps-fd.bea.gov)
• Consumer spending was a key driver: personal consumption expenditures grew 3.7% in Q3 and 4.2% in Q4 2024, the strongest two‑quarter stretch since 2023. (apps-fd.bea.gov)
• Goldman Sachs’ consumer dashboards through October–November 2024 explicitly describe the US consumer as a “source of strength”, with forecast real spending growth around 2.7–2.8% for 2024 and real income growth over 3%, alongside still‑strong household balance sheets. (marcus.com)
• Goldman’s Q3‑earnings call synthesis characterizes the consumer outlook as “mixed”: companies saw value‑seeking behavior and affordability concerns, but many still said the consumer remained healthy and resilient, and Consumer Discretionary stocks had begun to outperform again. (marcus.com)
  This is not consistent with the idea that by fall 2024 the consumer was broadly “really under pressure” relative to mid‑2024; instead, aggregate consumption accelerated.

3. Consumer credit cycle

• The Federal Reserve’s November 2024 Financial Stability Report notes that credit‑card delinquency rates had climbed to their highest levels since 2010, especially among non‑prime borrowers, and auto‑loan delinquencies were “somewhat above normal.” (federalreserve.gov)
• At the same time, the Fed stresses that vulnerabilities from household debt remain “moderate”: nominal GDP and incomes have been growing faster than debt, pushing the household debt‑to‑income ratio down to about 82%, below 2019 levels. (federalreserve.gov)
• The NY Fed’s Q3 and Q4 2024 Household Debt and Credit reports show total household debt rising modestly, with 3.5–3.6% of balances delinquent and around 2% seriously delinquent—higher than 2023 but still far from crisis territory. They explicitly describe overall household financial health as “solid”, even while acknowledging pockets of stress and elevated credit‑card delinquencies. (consumeraffairs.com)

2. A consumer “really under pressure” versus mid‑2024 – Instead, consumer spending growth accelerated in Q3–Q4 2024, and major forecasters described the consumer as a continuing source of strength, albeit with more value‑seeking behavior. (apps-fd.bea.gov)
3. A clearly worsening consumer credit cycle – Some elements of this came true (credit‑card defaults and delinquencies rose to post‑2010 highs), but within a broader context where overall household leverage and delinquency rates remained moderate by historical standards. (federalreserve.gov)

Because the central, most falsifiable part of the prediction—a broad-based pattern of revenue misses and an obviously tougher overall environment than mid‑2024—did not materialize, the prediction is best characterized as wrong, even though he was directionally right that lower‑income consumers and certain credit segments would come under increasing stress.