By late 2025, the core elements of Chamath’s prediction have materialized:

1. Major economies have begun adopting carbon border tariffs based on embedded emissions.

   • The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) was legislated in 2023 and entered a transitional phase on 1 October 2023, requiring importers of cement, steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen to report embedded greenhouse‑gas emissions; from 1 January 2026 they must buy CBAM certificates priced off the EU ETS, i.e., a de‑facto carbon tariff based on the product’s embedded emissions. (eeas.europa.eu)
   • The UK government has decided to introduce its own CBAM from 1 January 2027, placing a carbon price on imported, emissions‑intensive goods (iron & steel, aluminium, cement, hydrogen, fertilisers, etc.) calculated by reference to the UK ETS and explicitly including Scope 1, Scope 2 and certain precursor-product emissions. (gov.uk)
   • Other jurisdictions have not yet fully implemented CBAMs but are moving in that direction: Canada launched consultations on border carbon adjustments in 2021, and Australia has begun formal policy work and public signalling on a possible CBAM to protect emissions‑exposed sectors like steel and cement. (canada.ca) Global analyses from the World Bank explicitly note that the EU CBAM is encouraging more governments to consider carbon pricing in trade‑exposed sectors. (worldbank.org)
   • This is not yet universal adoption (e.g., the U.S. still has no enacted CBAM), and the UK CBAM will initially target basic materials rather than finished cars like a "British tariff on a German Volkswagen". But the overall trajectory of increasing use of carbon‑based import charges in trade policy is clear.

2. Evidence already shows substantial redistribution of economic value across countries and sectors.

   • The EU CBAM is widely reported as reshaping trade incentives: Reuters and other outlets note that Western Balkan electricity exporters are likely to become less competitive in EU markets unless they adopt domestic carbon pricing, potentially forcing major shifts in their power sectors and creating new revenue streams if they do so. (reuters.com)
   • India’s government has warned that its steel exports will be “significantly affected” because about two‑thirds of India’s steel exports go to Europe and will face the new EU carbon tax on high‑emission goods such as steel, aluminium and cement, directly threatening the value of those export flows. (reuters.com)
   • For Australia, business and policy groups emphasize that large fractions of aluminium and steel exports to the EU fall under CBAM, with compliance costs and potential loss of market share for higher‑carbon producers, while low‑carbon producers stand to gain—classic redistribution between firms and sectors. (bcsda.org.au) The UK government’s own CBAM documentation frames it as protecting decarbonizing domestic industries from being undercut by more carbon‑intensive imports, again implying gains for some producers and losses for others. (gov.uk)

Putting this together: since the 2021 podcast, carbon‑based border measures have moved from theory to binding law in the EU and UK, and they are already reordering trade incentives and profitability across high‑emission sectors and exporting countries. While the full magnitude of value destruction/creation will only be felt after CBAMs are fully operational (2026–2027 onward), the direction and mechanism Chamath described—carbon tariffs embedded in trade policy causing large redistributions of value—are now clearly in place. On that basis, the prediction is best judged as right, albeit still unfolding in scope and scale.