Evidence since 2022 shows that the big crossover hedge funds did sharply pull back from new private tech investing for several years, and they stopped being the dominant marginal capital in late‑stage rounds, which is the essence of Sacks’s prediction.

Key points:

1. Crossover activity collapsed post‑2021
   A 2023 VC review notes that major crossover funds such as Tiger Global, Temasek, Coatue, and SoftBank went from participating in $233 billion of VC deals in 2021 to just $34 billion in 2023. It characterizes this as a “retrenchment” that had a notable impact on late‑stage funding, with corporates and sovereign wealth funds “picking up the slack” as crossover funds scaled back. (allianceequityresearch.com)
   An India‑focused funding analysis similarly describes ~90% compression in crossover‑fund activity, explicitly citing Tiger Global and SoftBank as having “significantly reduced deal‑making.” (tice.news)
   This is consistent with “effectively withdrawing” as dominant late‑stage capital providers.

2. Tiger Global specifically pulled back and shrank its venture footprint
   Coverage of Tiger’s strategy after its 2022 losses says it “actively slowed its venture investments in 2022, curtailing their size and number,” and shifted away from later‑stage growth equity toward earlier‑stage VC bets. (thewealthadvisor.com)
   When Tiger finally closed its next private fund (PIP XVI) in 2024, it was only $2.2 billion, far below the $6 billion target and a fraction of its $12.7 billion 2021 fund, underscoring how much its late‑stage firepower had diminished and how cautious LPs had become. (ft.com)
   This supports the idea that Tiger was not rapidly redeploying massive late‑stage capital after 2022.

3. Coatue dramatically reduced deal volume and shifted strategy
   Crunchbase data show that Coatue’s venture deal count fell from 168 deals in 2021 to just 29 in 2023 (an 82% decline), and the total dollar amount of those deals dropped from about $43 billion to $4.1 billion. (news.crunchbase.com)
   While Coatue remained active in some large structured or AI‑related financings (e.g., leading a $1.1 billion round for AI cloud startup CoreWeave in 2024), these are exceptions within a much smaller, more selective portfolio—consistent with a retreat from the broad, aggressive late‑stage strategy that defined the 2020–21 boom. (marketwatch.com)

4. D1 and other crossovers also refocused away from new late‑stage privates
   Reporting on D1 Capital and similar crossover funds notes that after the tech sell‑off, D1 explicitly told startups it was slowing new private investments and instead was reallocating toward beaten‑down public names. (theinformation.com)
   A broader 2025 industry overview summarizes that when markets turned in 2022, many crossover investors pulled back dramatically from private tech investing, particularly at late stage; crossover capital remained in play only in a more limited, selective way. (afurrier.com)

5. Late‑stage capital shifted back to traditional VC/PE and corporates
   With crossover funds scaling back, late‑stage companies increasingly relied on large, traditional VC and growth‑equity firms and on corporates/sovereign wealth funds. The same 2023 review explicitly says corporates and SWFs “picked up the slack” as crossover funds retreated. (allianceequityresearch.com)
   Separately, PitchBook data cited by the Financial Times show 2024 U.S. VC fundraising heavily concentrated in a handful of big Silicon Valley firms (e.g., Andreessen Horowitz, General Catalyst, Thrive, Iconiq), which jointly raised the majority of VC dollars, reinforcing that traditional VCs became the main organized capital pool while crossover funds were nursing losses and retrenching. (ft.com)

6. They did eventually come back—especially in AI—but after a multi‑year lull
   By late 2024–2025, crossover names like Tiger Global and Coatue reappear in marquee AI rounds (e.g., Tiger planning to join a multibillion‑dollar OpenAI round; Coatue leading or joining billion‑dollar financings for CoreWeave), and Coatue is raising new AI‑focused capital. (reuters.com)
   However, that resurgence followed roughly two to three years (mid‑2022 through much of 2024) of sharply reduced, selective activity compared to their 2020–21 role. During that period, they were no longer the primary marginal capital in late‑stage private tech.

Putting this together: crossover hedge funds didn’t disappear entirely, but they did substantially withdraw from aggressive late‑stage private tech investing for several years after the 2022 correction, and other investors—especially large traditional VC/growth funds plus corporates/SWFs—became the main sources of capital in that segment. That outcome aligns closely with the normalized version of Sacks’s prediction, even if his on‑air phrasing (“they’re gone”) was somewhat hyperbolic and they eventually returned in a narrower, AI‑focused way.