The prediction was that, after roughly a 14% destruction of global wealth by May 2022, a large recession in the real economy would be inevitable and would materialize in the near term (1–2 years).

Key checkpoints between May 13, 2022 and May 13, 2024:

1. United States (most relevant real-economy benchmark)

   • The U.S. had two quarters of negative real GDP growth in early 2022, but that was before the podcast and was widely characterized as a “technical” or borderline case. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which is the standard arbiter for U.S. recessions, did not declare any U.S. recession for 2022–2024 up through mid‑2024.
   • U.S. real GDP continued to grow overall in 2022, 2023, and into early 2024, and the labor market remained historically tight with low unemployment and strong job creation. This is inconsistent with a “big recession” in the real economy.

2. Global picture

   • The IMF and World Bank documented a significant global slowdown, high inflation, and marked financial‑asset drawdowns post‑2021, but not a large, synchronized global real‑economy recession in 2022–2024. Instead, they described a period of “slow growth,” “stagflationary pressures,” and “fragmented” outcomes where some countries had mild or technical recessions, but the world economy as a whole continued to grow in real terms.
   • There were localized recessions (e.g., brief downturns in parts of Europe, the U.K., and specific emerging markets), yet these episodes were generally shallow or short‑lived rather than the sweeping “big recession” implied by the prediction.

3. Timing condition (1–2 years)

   • The prediction explicitly tied inevitability to the near term after May 13, 2022—i.e., by roughly May 13, 2024. By that point, despite substantial asset‑price declines and tighter monetary policy, the real‑economy outcomes were better described as a rough landing / soft-ish landing rather than a large, globally pervasive recession.

Because no major arbiter (e.g., NBER for the U.S., nor major international institutions for the world economy as a whole) characterizes 2022–2024 as a large real‑economy recession, and the dominant pattern was continued (if weak) growth plus localized, mostly mild recessions, the prediction that a big recession was “inevitable” in the subsequent 1–2 years did not come true.

Therefore, the appropriate classification is: wrong.