Evidence since Dobbs shows some clear political costs to Republicans on abortion, but not the kind of broad, overwhelming, long‑term national penalty implied by “massive price,” and the overall partisan balance has recently shifted in their favor.

Evidence for real costs:

• In the 2022 midterms, Republicans badly underperformed historical midterm gains; KFF/AP VoteCast finds about half of voters said overturning Roe had a major impact on which candidates they supported, with those voters breaking heavily for Democrats, especially in key Senate and gubernatorial races in states like Pennsylvania and Arizona. (kff.org)
• A county‑level study of the 2022 election finds that in states with abortion ballot measures, the Republican U.S. House vote margin fell by about 4.8 percentage points relative to prior midterms, enough to plausibly flip dozens of close seats—evidence of a measurable GOP penalty tied to abortion politics in those states. (sciencedirect.com)
• Since Dobbs, every statewide vote framed as expanding or protecting abortion rights in competitive or even red-leaning states (e.g., Kansas 2022, Michigan 2022, Ohio 2023, plus Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, and Montana constitutional amendments in 2024) has passed, while high‑profile efforts to entrench or expand abortion bans have repeatedly failed (e.g., Kentucky 2022, Ohio 2023). (cbsnews.com) This constrains Republican policy options and shows their preferred position is often a policy loser, even among electorates that are otherwise willing to back GOP candidates.

Evidence against a clear, massive long‑term partisan price:

• Despite these headwinds, by 2024 Republicans regained the presidency (Trump defeating Harris), flipped the U.S. Senate to a GOP majority, and held the U.S. House—giving the party full federal governing control for the first time since 2016. (en.wikipedia.org) That outcome is hard to square with the idea that Dobbs inflicted a uniformly “massive” nationwide electoral penalty on the GOP.
• Recent national polling shows the Democratic Party currently has worse favorability numbers than the Republican Party, with Dems’ unfavorables at multi‑decade highs and Republicans slightly less disliked and now leading or competitive on many issue‑trust measures. (nypost.com) If Dobbs had produced a broad, enduring anti‑GOP backlash, you would expect the opposite pattern.
• Public opinion on abortion itself has moved modestly but not dramatically: roughly 6 in 10 Americans now say abortion should be legal in all or most cases, up only a few points from pre‑Dobbs levels, and “pro‑choice” identification has an edge but not an overwhelming one. (pewresearch.org) This puts Republican issue positions out of step with the median voter, but it has not yet translated into consistent, decisive partisan realignment away from the GOP.

Why this is rated ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong:

• There is good evidence that Dobbs has imposed targeted, sometimes decisive costs on Republicans—especially in swing races, ballot measures, and among key blocs of women and younger voters—and that it remains a structural vulnerability for the party. (kff.org)
• At the same time, by late 2025 Republicans control the presidency and both chambers of Congress, hold or dominate many state governments, and are not suffering uniquely poor favorability compared with Democrats. (en.wikipedia.org) That outcome is inconsistent with the prediction of a clear, sweeping, long‑term national political collapse triggered by overturning Roe.

Given these mixed signals—real but bounded electoral and policy costs versus continued GOP institutional strength and competitive or better national ratings—the net long‑term effect of Dobbs on Republican fortunes is, as of 2025, genuinely unclear. Hence the prediction is best classified as ambiguous, not definitively validated or disproven.