The prediction was conditional on a specific policy: broad forgiveness of the first $10,000 of student loans for roughly 43 million borrowers (around $0.5T total).

What actually happened:

• In August 2022, the Biden administration announced a plan to cancel up to $10,000 (or $20,000 for Pell recipients) for most federal borrowers, with a projected cost in the hundreds of billions.
• On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down this broad-based forgiveness plan, so the mass $10k cancellation for ~43M people never went into effect.
• Instead, the administration has pursued narrower relief through existing programs and regulatory changes (PSLF fixes, borrower defense, new IDR rules, etc.), which by mid‑2024 had forgiven on the order of $150–$170B for a few million borrowers—not the half‑trillion, 43M‑borrower scenario described in the prediction.

Because the specific policy (“forgive the first $10k for 43M borrowers, ~$0.5T total”) was not implemented, we can’t empirically observe the macroeconomic effect of exactly that action. Any claim about whether it would have been significantly stimulative and raised near‑term U.S. growth is therefore a counterfactual judgment, not something we can verify against realized data.

So:

• The condition of the prediction (that particular form and scale of forgiveness) did not occur.
• Without that, the impact on spending and growth cannot be directly measured.

Given this, the correct evaluation is ambiguous: there isn’t a realized outcome to check the prediction against, even though enough time has passed.