There has been enough time since April 2022 to see outcomes, but the evidence about corporate political engagement and shareholder value is mixed rather than clearly validating Chamath’s “Coinbase-style” path.
1. Disney and Netflix did not become clear, one-sided cautionary tales about activism.
Netflix’s 2022 stock collapse (down ~75% from late‑2021 to a low around $162) was widely attributed to streaming saturation, competition, and business-model issues; by mid‑2023 it had strongly rebounded above $400 after password‑sharing crackdowns and an ad tier, with analysts treating it as a strategic turnaround rather than a parable about internal political activism. (podscripts.co) Disney’s stock badly underperformed 2021‑2023, but mainstream analysis focuses on over‑investment in streaming, cord‑cutting, and park economics; its Florida “Don’t Say Gay” political feud is part of the narrative but not a consensus primary driver of valuation. (en.wikipedia.org) That makes it hard to claim there is simple, widely accepted numerical proof that their employee or cultural “wokeness” is what hurt shareholders.
2. Some numeric evidence does show activism can be costly, but it’s selective and contested.
Studies of corporate sociopolitical activism (CSA) up to and including 2023 find that, on average, CSA events trigger small negative abnormal stock returns, with misaligned activism (against key stakeholders’ values) causing larger drops, and well‑aligned activism sometimes yielding modest gains. (jcsr.springeropen.com) High‑profile backlash cases like the 2023 Bud Light boycott show large, quantifiable damage (double‑digit U.S. revenue and sales declines and a substantial market‑cap hit) when branding is perceived as politically misaligned with core customers. (en.wikipedia.org) At the same time, broader coverage (e.g., the BBC’s “go woke, go broke” analysis) emphasizes that financial outcomes depend on execution and stakeholder alignment: some “woke” campaigns (Nike, others) have been commercially successful, so there is no clean, universal rule that activism destroys value. (feeds.bbci.co.uk)
3. CEO behavior and expectations have not converged on Coinbase’s apolitical model.
Brian Armstrong’s 2020 “mission‑focused, apolitical” memo at Coinbase remains a prominent example, but there has not been a broad wave of Fortune‑500 CEOs explicitly adopting Coinbase‑style “no politics at work” policies in 2022–2023; corporate sociopolitical activism is still common across large firms. (latimes.com) In parallel, surveys like the Edelman Trust Barometer in 2022–2023 show majorities of employees and consumers expect CEOs to speak out on societal issues (climate, discrimination, etc.), and see business leaders as key actors in addressing them, even while warning that companies must tread carefully to avoid politicization. (forbes.com) That push for engagement runs directly against a universal shift to Coinbase’s apolitical stance.
4. Net assessment.
Chamath forecast that within a few quarters, CEOs would be able to numerically show that Armstrong’s apolitical path is the clearly value‑creating one versus accommodating internal political activism, and use that as a basis for policy. What we actually see by mid‑2023 and beyond is:
- real numerical examples both for and against visible sociopolitical stances;
- ongoing academic evidence that activism is risky and often mildly value‑destructive, but sometimes beneficial when aligned; and
- no clear, broad managerial consensus or behavioral shift toward Coinbase‑style apoliticism.
Because the data can be (and is) used by advocates on both sides, and there is no widely accepted, one‑directional “scoreboard” from Disney/Netflix or similar cases, the prediction that CEOs would have clear, one‑sided numerical proof that “Brian’s path” is superior is neither convincingly fulfilled nor cleanly falsified. The outcome is best described as ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong.