Evidence from 2022–2024 shows that emerging and developing economies in Asia and Africa suffered material, prolonged economic harm from the post‑invasion food, fuel, and fertilizer shock linked to the Russia–Ukraine war and associated disruptions (including sanctions and counter‑sanctions).

Key points:

1. Developing countries—especially Africa—flagged as most exposed very early (March 2022). A UNCTAD rapid assessment, published two weeks after the invasion, warned that the war had triggered rising food, fuel, and fertilizer prices, heightened financial volatility, and mounting trade costs, and stated that the situation was “alarming for developing countries, and especially for African and least developed countries,” many of which were particularly exposed to higher commodity prices and financial‑market effects, with risks of food shortages, inflation‑induced recessions, and civil unrest. UNCTAD rapid assessment

2. Food and fuel price spikes hit import‑dependent African states hardest. The war and sanctions disrupted grain and vegetable‑oil exports from Russia and Ukraine, which together accounted pre‑war for around 27% of global wheat exports and over half of sunflower oil and seed exports, driving wheat and other staple prices to their highest levels since 2008. This was expected to “most severely affect” countries in MENA and East Africa that rely heavily on imports from the two belligerents, worsening already serious food insecurity in places like Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan.(en.wikipedia.org) FAO/WFP and UN analyses show these price shocks deepened the 2022–2023 global food crisis, with tens of millions more in East and West Africa facing acute food insecurity.

3. Documented crises in specific African and Asian economies.

   • Sub‑Saharan Africa: The IMF reports that Russia’s war and related spillovers on food and energy prices “further aggravated” fragile and conflict‑affected states; Sub‑Saharan Africa was “hit particularly hard,” with consumer prices rising over 20% on average and public debt nearing 60% of GDP, while 123 million people (about 12% of the region’s population) faced acute food insecurity.(meetings.imf.org)
   • Ethiopia/Horn of Africa: Ethiopia relied heavily on grain imports from Russia and Ukraine; the invasion exacerbated an existing food crisis by disrupting supply chains and sharply increasing food prices, worsening famine conditions in northern Ethiopia.(en.wikipedia.org)
   • West Africa: Scholarly and FAO/WFP analyses show the war substantially worsened food security in West Africa, with disrupted grain imports, sharply higher prices, and rising malnutrition in countries like Niger and Mali.(link.springer.com)
   • Pakistan (Asia): Pakistan experienced a major economic and balance‑of‑payments crisis in 2022–2024; among the listed causes is “rising fuel prices due to [the] Russian invasion of Ukraine,” which contributed to surging inflation (nearly 38% in May 2023) and severe cost‑of‑living pressures.(en.wikipedia.org)
   • Sri Lanka (Asia): Sri Lanka’s 2019–2024 economic crisis had many domestic causes but was intensified by the war’s impact on global commodity and fertilizer prices; the 2022–2023 global food crisis description notes that after Sri Lanka reversed its own fertilizer ban, the Russian invasion had driven fertilizer prices so high that they became unaffordable for a country already short on foreign exchange, compounding food shortages and contributing to mass protests and sovereign default.(en.wikipedia.org)

4. Macro‑level downgrades for emerging markets and commodity importers. World Bank and UN analyses attribute a significant part of the 2022–2023 growth slowdown in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) to the war‑induced spike in food and energy prices. The World Bank warned that negative spillovers from the war would more than offset any benefits to commodity exporters, and that oil and gas price surges would cut growth in commodity‑importing developing economies such as China, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey.(blogs.worldbank.org) This translated into weaker growth, higher inflation, and tighter financing conditions for many Asian and African EMs over at least 2022–2023.

5. Duration and severity match an “extended period” of difficulty. The food‑ and fuel‑price shock and its knock‑on effects (inflation, debt stress, reduced growth and investment) persisted well beyond a few months. The UN’s March 2023 economic briefing still highlighted the “lingering war in Ukraine” as a key driver of elevated energy prices, food shortages, and slowed recovery in developing regions.(un.org) Crises in Pakistan and Sri Lanka are dated 2022–2024, with deep economic distress lasting several years rather than being short‑lived.(en.wikipedia.org)

Causally, these outcomes were not due only to Russia sanctions and war‑related commodity shocks; domestic mismanagement, prior debt build‑ups, COVID‑19 scars, and climate‑related disasters also played major roles. But Chamath’s claim was about the direction and materiality of the effect: that sanctions/war‑driven commodity and financial shocks would create “really, really deleterious”, prolonged economic conditions in emerging markets in Asia and Africa. The record from 2022–2024 shows exactly such extended harm across multiple EMs in both regions, consistent with his prediction.