Timeframe and conditions of the prediction have not yet fully played out.

1. Nuclear build‑out (140 new plants over ~30 years, +15–20% capacity, enabling coal retirement)
• China’s official targets are broadly consistent with a very large nuclear build, on the order Friedberg described. Policy documents and analyses cite goals of about 150 new reactors between 2020 and 2035 and ~200 GW of nuclear capacity by 2035, far above today’s level.(en.wikipedia.org)
• As of end‑2024, China had 58 reactors operating (~61 GW) and around 27–32 GW under construction, and the State Council has been approving roughly 10–11 new reactors a year since 2021.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Including operational, under‑construction, and recently approved units, China had just over 100 reactors in the pipeline by late‑2024, well short of 140 completed stations but clearly on an aggressive build trajectory.(nuclearbusiness-platform.com)

Conclusion on this leg: China is indeed pursuing a very large nuclear expansion consistent with the plan Friedberg referenced, but we are only a few years into a 30‑year horizon, so we cannot yet say whether the full 140‑plant build and the specific 15–20% capacity effect will be realized.

2. Industrial power prices falling from ~$0.07–0.08 to ~$0.04–0.05 per kWh over ~a decade
• Recent data show average 2024 electricity prices for energy‑intensive industrial users in China around 7.7 cents/kWh, while the United States and India were about 6.3 cents/kWh.(energyupdate.com.pk)
• Another cross‑country dataset (GlobalPetrolPrices) reports March 2025 business electricity in China at 0.794 CNY/kWh (~11.2 US cents), though this category is broader than just heavy industry.(globalpetrolprices.com)
• Local industrial tariffs by province (e.g., Dalian 35 kV and above) show prices around 0.61 CNY/kWh in late 2024, roughly 8–9 US cents, down from a high of 0.84 CNY/kWh in 2021, but still well above the 4–5 cent range Friedberg projected.(ceicdata.com)

So far there is no evidence of a nationwide drop toward 4–5 cents/kWh; rather, average industrial prices remain around or above the 7–8 cent level he cited as the starting point.

3. China’s energy‑cost advantage vs. the United States
• Friedberg said China was already 30–40% cheaper than the U.S. on an industrial electricity basis and that nuclear would widen this gap.
• Current comparative data show China’s industrial electricity prices in 2024 (7.7¢/kWh) higher than the U.S. (6.3¢/kWh) for energy‑intensive industries, i.e., the U.S. is cheaper on average, not more expensive.(energyupdate.com.pk)
• Other analyses likewise place typical Chinese industrial rates on the order of $0.07–0.10/kWh, overlapping or slightly above typical U.S. ranges rather than being 30–40% lower.(linkedin.com)

Thus, his baseline claim about China already being 30–40% cheaper appears incorrect, and there is no observed widening of a Chinese cost advantage so far; if anything, current data show a modest U.S. advantage on average.

Why the overall verdict is “inconclusive” rather than “wrong”
• The core forward‑looking part of the prediction is explicitly framed over “roughly the next 30 years” for the build‑out and “over the next decade” for the price effect. As of November 2025, we are only about 3½ years past the 2022 podcast date, i.e., early in both time windows.
• While current evidence contradicts several of his assumptions (China already 30–40% cheaper, imminent drop to 4–5¢/kWh, clear widening vs the U.S.), it is still technically possible—though increasingly challenging—that a combination of massive nuclear additions, policy reforms, and subsidies could drive larger price declines later in the decade.

Given that:

• The nuclear expansion he described is broadly aligned with China’s stated plans and ongoing approvals, but far from completed; and
• The expected large, sustained price drop and widened cost advantage have not materialized yet, but the 10‑year horizon has not expired,

the fairest classification as of late 2025 is “inconclusive (too early)” rather than definitively right or wrong.