Evidence suggests Chamath’s core claim—that Tiger Global’s light-touch, passive-style Series A strategy would attract many founders because they preferred non‑intrusive capital—largely played out, even though the strategy later proved financially painful.

Key points:

• Tiger’s model was explicitly hands‑off and marketed as founder‑friendly. Analyses of Tiger Global’s venture practice describe a deliberate “hands-off, founder‑trusting approach,” with very fast decisions, minimal governance, and a pattern of not taking board seats or imposing heavy reporting. This was framed as a competitive advantage because it reduced friction for founders and was “indeed compelling to many entrepreneurs.”(umbrex.com) That maps closely to Chamath’s “they may never call you / you won’t get fired” description.

• Founders did flock to Tiger’s checks in the immediate years around and after the prediction. During the boom, Tiger became one of the world’s most aggressive startup investors, backing hundreds of companies. In early 2022—around when Chamath spoke—Crunchbase data shows Tiger as the most active early‑stage lead investor globally, with 96 early-stage deals in H1 2022, up from 69 in the prior half.(news.crunchbase.com) In India specifically, Tiger’s Series A participation jumped sharply: it joined 10 Series A rounds totaling about $377M in just the first half of 2022 (vs. 3 such rounds in all of 2021), and Series A capital it backed in India rose roughly 3x year‑on‑year; overall Series A participation in 2022 was up ~80% by value versus 2021, even as its global investing slowed.(moneycontrol.com) Those are exactly the kinds of “many founders taking passive Series A money” outcomes he predicted.

• The motivation he cited—founders preferring passive, non‑governance capital—matches broader commentary. Post‑bubble reflections explicitly criticize the 2020–21 wave of ultra “founder‑friendly” capital as investors who stayed hands‑off, let founders raise at record valuations, and provided little governance—precisely because founders liked that arrangement at the time.(techcrunch.com) This supports Chamath’s claim that plenty of entrepreneurs would choose such capital even if it wasn’t optimal for company quality.

• Where he wasn’t right is on long‑term outcomes, not founder demand. Tiger’s pandemic‑era “spray and pray” venture fund (PIP 15) has since landed in the bottom decile of its 2021 vintage, with >15% paper losses as of mid‑2024, and its follow‑on private fund (PIP 16) closed at just $2.2B vs. an original $6B target, reflecting LP pushback and a sharp pullback in its VC ambitions.(techcrunch.com) Those results show the financial strategy backfired, but they don’t contradict his narrower prediction about founders being willing to take Tiger’s passive money.

Overall, the record shows: Tiger’s light‑touch Series A strategy did, for a time, attract a very large number of founders for the very reasons Chamath described, even if the subsequent market turn exposed that such “founder‑friendly” passivity was bad for returns and governance. That makes his prediction about founder behavior and near‑term uptake essentially right.