Available post‑2022 data show a clear, measurable rightward shift among Asian American voters, while they still overall lean Democratic.

1. Evidence of a measurable shift away from Democrats

• Baseline: In 2020, Asian Americans gave Joe Biden about 63% of their vote, and were a solidly Democratic constituency; as of 2023, roughly 62% of Asian American registered voters identified with or leaned Democratic, vs. 34% Republican/lean Republican.

  Sources: Wikipedia summary of Asian American vote shares; Pew 2022–23 survey of Asian voters. (en.wikipedia.org)

• In 2024, multiple analyses find a significant rightward shift:

  • A table of racial vote shares shows Democratic share of the Asian vote falling from ~63% in 2020 to ~54% in 2024 in the presidential race — a ~9‑point drop for Democrats. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • A RealClearPolitics analysis using Washington Post and NBC exit polls reports a 9‑point national shift toward Republicans among Asian American voters vs. 2020; in some states (e.g., Nevada and Texas) exit polls suggest Trump actually won the Asian vote. (realclearpolitics.com)
  • A Pew-based recap (reported in the New York Post) similarly finds Trump’s support among Asian voters rising from about 30% in 2020 to around 40% in 2024, another indication of a sizeable rightward move. (nypost.com)

• Party identification also nudges away from Democrats: AAPI Data’s pre‑election surveys show Democratic ID among Asian American voters slipping from 44% (2020) to 42% (2024), Republicans holding around 22–23%, and independents growing from 25% to 31%, i.e., modest but real erosion of solid Democratic identification. (aapidata.com)

• Local results reinforce the pattern: In New York, majority‑Asian precincts moved 23 points to the right between 2018 and 2022; in 2024 Trump flipped several New York City Assembly districts with large Asian populations, with analysts noting that heavily Asian neighborhoods in southern Brooklyn and Queens showed some of the largest pro‑Trump swings. (theamericanconservative.com)

Taken together, these national and local data show a measurable shift of Asian Americans away from their prior level of reliable Democratic support, consistent with the core quantitative part of the prediction.

2. Role of education/“war on merit” and public safety

The prediction tied the shift partly to Democratic‑backed policies seen as a “war on merit” in education and to declining public safety. There is substantial, though not perfectly causal, evidence that these themes were important drivers in the places where the shift has been most visible:

• Education / “war on merit”:

  • In San Francisco, the 2022 recall of three school‑board members—heavily supported by Asian American parents—was closely linked to controversies over ending merit‑based admissions at Lowell High School and prioritizing symbolic renamings over academic concerns. These moves were framed by critics as attacks on merit and fairness in competitive schooling. (en.wikipedia.org)
  • In New York City, proposals and lawsuits targeting merit‑based gifted and specialized‑high‑school admissions (Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, etc.) were widely described by opponents as a “war on merit,” especially by Asian parent groups who saw them as threatening opportunities their children had earned through testing. (realcleareducation.com)
  • Coverage of Asian voters “shifting right” in New York explicitly mentions anger over these school‑admissions changes as a factor behind the dramatic 23‑point move toward Republicans in majority‑Asian precincts. (theamericanconservative.com)

• Public safety / crime:

  • A RealClearPolitics post‑2024 analysis argues that Asian Americans, like Hispanics, “shifted right” in part due to dissatisfaction with Democratic leadership on crime and public order, highlighting concern about personal safety and harassment. (realclearpolitics.com)
  • Reporting on New York and other urban areas finds that Asian American voters in neighborhoods that swung hardest toward Trump cite crime, homelessness, and public safety as primary reasons for abandoning their traditional Democratic votes. (theguardian.com)
  • AAPI Data’s 2022 and 2024 surveys list crime and education among the top‑ranked issues for Asian American voters (alongside economy and healthcare), and show that voters are more divided on which party they trust on crime than on issues like gun control or voting rights. (aapidata.com)

These sources do not “prove” causality in a strict econometric sense, but they broadly support the narrative that concerns over merit‑based education policies and public safety were salient factors in the notable rightward swings among Asian American voters in key urban areas and in the national 2024 results.

3. Important caveats

• Asian Americans still lean Democratic overall: as of 2022–23, about 62% of Asian registered voters identify or lean Democratic and 34% Republican; pre‑2024 surveys often showed Harris or Biden leading Trump comfortably among Asian voters, and AAPI polls in September 2024 still had Harris ahead among Asian Americans by roughly 2‑to‑1. (pewresearch.org)
• The shift is significant but not a total “flip” of the entire community into the Republican column; it is better described as erosion of the Democrats’ prior dominance and emergence of a more competitive, heterogeneous electorate.

Bottom line: By late 2024, Asian American voters had measurably shifted away from their earlier level of solid Democratic support, with Republican vote share rising and Democratic margins shrinking nationally and in key states. Media and analytical accounts consistently tie that shift in part to backlash against education policies perceived as undermining merit‑based advancement and to frustration with crime and public safety in Democratic‑run cities. That aligns closely with the substance of Sacks’s prediction, so it is best classified as right (with the caveat that the shift is partial, not an outright partisan flip).