By the end of 2022, Putin and Russia did not end up with increased geopolitical leverage or a stronger position vis-à-vis NATO compared to prior years.

Key developments:

• On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full‑scale invasion of Ukraine. This triggered unprecedented Western sanctions and a sharp deterioration in Russia’s relations with the US and Europe, leaving Russia more isolated economically and diplomatically than before 2022.
• Rather than weakening NATO, the invasion reinvigorated and expanded the alliance. Finland and Sweden both applied to join NATO in 2022, explicitly citing the Russian invasion as the reason; their accession was widely described as a major strategic setback for Russia, as it expanded NATO’s presence around Russia’s borders and in the Baltic region.
• NATO and the US significantly increased military, financial, and political support to Ukraine and boosted force deployments on NATO’s eastern flank, strengthening NATO’s cohesion and deterrence posture against Russia.
• Although Russia did temporarily wield energy leverage over Europe in 2022 through gas supply cuts and price spikes, the EU accelerated diversification away from Russian energy. By late 2022 and into 2023, Europe had sharply reduced its dependence on Russian gas, undermining that leverage and further damaging Russia’s long‑term economic position.

Given these outcomes, Putin did not “become a stronger player on the global stage” or increase his leverage over NATO over the course of 2022; instead, his actions largely strengthened NATO and weakened Russia’s broader geopolitical standing. Therefore, the prediction is wrong.