Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and aggregators show that after 2020’s low inflation (about 1.2%), U.S. inflation moved to a clearly higher, multi‑year regime starting in 2021, rather than a brief spike:

• Average annual CPI inflation: 2021: 4.7%, 2022: 8.0%, 2023: 4.1%, 2024: 2.9%, 2025: 2.7% (through latest data). This is markedly above the ~1–2% range that prevailed for most of the 2010s. (usinflationcalculator.com)
• Other summaries of the U.S. economy report very similar figures: roughly 7.9% in 2022, 4.1% in 2023, 2.9% in 2024, 2.7% in 2025, confirming a multi‑year period of elevated inflation relative to the Fed’s 2% target. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The "2021–2023 inflation surge" overview likewise notes that inflation peaked at 9.1% in June 2022 and, while it declined, was still around 2.7% as of mid‑2025, with uncertainty about fully returning to target. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Separate analysis from large financial institutions shows U.S. PCE inflation peaking above 7% and only returning close to target (~2.1%) by late 2024, underscoring that the high‑inflation phase persisted for several years rather than fading quickly. (jpmorgan.com)

From the vantage point of late 2021, consensus policymakers frequently described inflation as “transitory,” expecting a fairly quick return to low rates. In reality, inflation stayed well above the prior‑decade norm for at least three full years (2021–2023) and only moved down toward target after aggressive monetary tightening, with levels in 2024–2025 still somewhat above the pre‑COVID pattern. (usinflationcalculator.com)

The causal mechanism Chamath emphasized (underinvestment and distorted work incentives) is harder to isolate empirically, but the core, testable part of his claim—that the U.S. would enter a multi‑year period of persistently higher inflation, not a short transitory blip beginning in 2021—is borne out by the data. Therefore, the prediction is best judged as right on the inflation path itself.