Chamath was directionally right that inflation would not be a brief blip, but the regime and asset‑allocation call he described did not materialize by 2023.

Macro regime vs. “late 1970s”
• In the late 1970s/early 1980s, U.S. CPI inflation ran persistently in high single to double digits: about 7.6% in 1978, 11.3% in 1979, and 13.5% in 1980, and the misery index (inflation + unemployment) approached 20. (officialdata.org)
• Post‑podcast, U.S. annual inflation did spike but then fell: roughly 4.7% (2021), 8.0% (2022), and 4.1% (2023), with year‑over‑year CPI down to about 3.4% by December 2023—elevated vs. the Fed’s 2% target but far from a sustained late‑70s‑style double‑digit regime. (theworlddata.com)
• Real GDP grew 1.9% in 2022 and 2.5% in 2023, and the national unemployment rate was about 3.6% in 2022–2023—near multi‑decade lows, not the weak‑growth, high‑joblessness environment of the Carter/Volcker era. (apps-fd.bea.gov)

So the U.S. did experience a sharp but relatively short‑lived inflation episode with solid real growth and very low unemployment, rather than a late‑1970s stagflationary regime.

Risk assets vs. “risk off” by 2023
• For broad U.S. equities, the S&P 500 total return was −18.1% in 2022 but +26.3% in 2023; over the two calendar years combined that’s a modest positive cumulative return (~+3–4%). (slickcharts.com)
• High‑beta tech did not turn into a multi‑year disaster: the Nasdaq‑100 dropped about 33% in 2022 but then surged roughly 54–55% in 2023, leaving investors who held through both years slightly ahead overall. (slickcharts.com)
• Short‑term “risk‑off” assets like 3‑month Treasury bills returned roughly 1–2% in 2022 and about 5% in 2023 (as proxied by the ICE BofA 3‑month T‑bill index and the TBIL ETF), so over 2022–23 cash‑like instruments slightly outperformed the S&P 500—but only by a small margin, and 2023’s huge equity rally sharply contradicted the idea that you generally “don’t want to own risk assets.” (sec.gov)

Netting this out: we did not enter a late‑70s‑style macro regime by 2023, and while risk‑off assets were somewhat competitive (or marginally better) over the specific 2022–23 window, risk assets—especially high‑beta tech—rebounded strongly rather than being a persistently poor strategy. On balance, that makes the prediction wrong rather than right or merely ambiguous.