By November 30, 2025—over four years after the September 2021 statement—China has not experienced the kind of revolutionary upheaval implied by “on the brink of having a revolution” (i.e., a large‑scale revolt that fundamentally challenges or topples CCP rule).

There have been significant protests, most notably the 2022 “White Paper” / zero‑COVID protests, which spread across many cities, included unusually direct calls in some places for Xi Jinping or the CCP to step down, and led to a rapid end of the zero‑COVID policy. However, these events are characterized in scholarship and reporting as protests or civil unrest, not as a revolution; they were relatively short‑lived and did not develop into a sustained nationwide insurrection against the regime. (en.wikipedia.org)

Over the same period, the CCP under Xi Jinping has consolidated power rather than lost it: Xi secured an unprecedented third term as General Secretary at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 and was then granted a third term as PRC president in March 2023, with the top leadership packed with loyalists and the party–state security apparatus intact and active. (theguardian.com) Analyses of post‑Congress governance emphasize continued or even tightened central control—“People’s Republic of Control 3.0” rather than regime breakdown. (usip.org)

Given that no large‑scale revolutionary overthrow or near‑overthrow of CCP rule has occurred and the regime remains firmly in power, the specific prediction that China was on the brink of a revolution in the near‑to‑medium term is best classified as wrong, despite the occurrence of notable but contained protest waves.