Evidence from 2022 shows that, as the 18–24‑month clocks on the huge 2020–2021 SPAC cohort started to run out (deadlines falling mostly in late 2022 and early 2023), the SPAC market experienced exactly the kind of stressed, distorted behavior Chamath described.

• Deadlines from the 2020–2021 boom created a wall of expiring SPACs by late 2022. An August 2022 analysis by SPACInsider/Institutional Investor noted that 141 SPACs had already been searching for a target for 18+ months and that by September this would jump to 256 – about 44% of all 576 SPACs still looking – mainly from the Q1 2021 boom. The report warned that many of these would likely be forced into liquidation as the 24‑month window and proposed SEC rules converged, explicitly tying the coming “reckoning” to approaching deadlines on the 2020–2021 SPACs.(institutionalinvestor.com) Similarly, a May 2022 Daily Upside piece highlighted roughly 280 “untethered” SPACs with transaction deadlines in Q1 2023, calling the situation a “ticking time bomb” and warning that, in their desperation to avoid forfeiting $5–10 million of sponsor capital, some SPACs could merge with weak companies just to beat the clock.(thedailyupside.com) This matches Chamath’s mechanism: deadlines on the COVID‑era SPAC wave driving abnormal behavior.

• Market dislocation and extreme investor behavior intensified into late 2022. A Russell Investments review, using SPAC Research data, shows SPAC liquidations jumping from 1 in Q1 2022 to 6 in Q2, 14 in Q3, and 117 in Q4 2022, a step‑function increase right as many 2020–2021 vehicles hit or neared their two‑year limits. The same source notes average redemption rates climbing above 90%, forcing sponsors either to rely on onerous PIPE/convertible financing or to liquidate and eat their upfront costs, with sponsor losses in 2022 alone well over $1 billion.(russellinvestments.com) Bloomberg/Carrier Management described the “Great SPAC Crash of 2022” and reported that for SPACs going to a vote in December 2022, an astonishing 96% of shareholders on average chose to redeem, with expectations that December would see as many liquidations as the prior five years combined – a dramatic market breakdown tied directly to this maturing cohort.(carriermanagement.com)

• “Crazy behavior” in dealmaking: cancellations, retrades, and heavy pressure on sponsors. Legal/market commentary from Wachtell Lipton documents that 2022 saw 65 de‑SPAC M&A deals withdrawn (vs. 18 in 2021), alongside a collapse in new SPAC IPOs and de‑SPAC activity, as high redemptions, regulatory pressure, and poor post‑merger performance made deals much harder to close and forced renegotiations or terminations.(clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu) Concrete examples include the Circle–Concord SPAC: Circle’s valuation was doubled from $4.5B to $9B in a renegotiated February 2022 deal, then the transaction was repeatedly delayed and finally terminated in December 2022; broader coverage noted that at least 56 SPAC tie‑ups were called off in 2022 and that dozens of SPACs were being liquidated with many more expected.(paymentsdive.com) Another example is the FinTech Acquisition V / eToro transaction, which had its valuation cut and then was abandoned in July 2022; FinTech V failed to find a replacement target in time and moved to dissolve and return capital by December 9, 2022, explicitly because it couldn’t close a deal within its required period.(fxnewsgroup.com) This pattern of repricings, failed deals, and mass liquidations illustrates the “re‑trades” and dislocation Chamath anticipated.

• Sponsors resorted to unusual sweeteners and maneuvers to fight redemptions and buy time. With redemption rates soaring, sponsors in 2022 began using aggressive non‑redemption agreements and founder‑share giveaways to keep deals or extensions alive. For example, a February 2022 non‑redemption agreement for East Stone Acquisition Corp. committed the sponsor to transfer founder shares to investors who agreed not to redeem, and to increase that transfer for each month from May–August 2022 that the business combination had not yet closed – effectively paying investors extra equity just to delay redemptions while up against the clock.(sec.gov) Reddit posts tracking individual SPACs in December 2022 show similar behavior: Williams Rowland Acquisition Corp.’s sponsors signed non‑redemption agreements covering over 2.1 million shares, promising blocks of founder shares in exchange, while its co‑CEO personally bought ~742k shares near trust value to backstop redemptions ahead of a vote to extend the deadline; another SPAC, Northern Star Investment Corp. II, repeatedly adjourned its extension meeting “to allow additional time…to solicit…redemption reversals,” while its sponsor entered non‑redemption agreements that transferred sponsor shares to investors who agreed not to redeem.(reddit.com)(reddit.com) These kinds of side deals, special extensions, and sponsor‑funded sweeteners are not normal IPO behavior; they reflect exactly the kind of “really crazy” sponsor pressure Chamath predicted would emerge as expirations loomed.

Putting this together:

• The massive 2020–2021 SPAC cohort did in fact run into a wall of 18–24‑month deadlines in late 2022/early 2023.
• In roughly the six quarters leading up to and through November 2022, the SPAC market went from boom to crash, featuring record redemptions, waves of liquidations, a spike in withdrawn or repriced deals, and an explosion of unusual sponsor concessions and sweeteners.
• Contemporaneous commentary explicitly tied these dynamics to impending deadlines and sponsors’ desire to avoid losing their at‑risk capital.

The exact month Chamath highlighted (November 2022) ended up being part of a broader 2022–early‑2023 bust rather than a single inflection point, but the core content of his prediction—that as the two‑year clocks on the 2020–2021 SPACs approached expiry, the sector would see significant dislocation and “crazy” behaviors in dealmaking and sponsor incentives—was borne out by subsequent events. Therefore, this prediction is best classified as right.