The prediction explicitly concerns “the foreseeable future (at least over the coming decade)” starting from the episode’s release on 17 October 2025, so it cannot reasonably be judged less than two months later (by 30 November 2025). A 10‑year labor‑market claim needs most or all of that horizon to play out.

Early evidence about AI and jobs is still mixed and preliminary:

• Surveys and regional data (e.g., New York Fed) find AI adoption rising but layoffs directly attributed to AI remain rare; many firms report using AI mainly as a productivity tool and plan to retrain workers, which aligns with the “AI as tool/augmentation” part of the claim, at least so far. (pymnts.com)
• Large workforce studies (e.g., SHRM 2025) show substantial task-level automation but relatively few jobs that are both highly automatable and free of non‑technical barriers to full replacement, suggesting transformation and partial automation rather than wholesale job loss for now. (shrm.org)
• Other analyses (Goldman Sachs Research, PwC, WEF and similar summaries) project that AI may eventually displace a meaningful share of jobs, but also emphasize uncertainty and the potential for offsetting job creation and productivity gains over many years, not weeks. (goldmansachs.com)
• Prominent experts like Geoffrey Hinton and Dario Amodei warn that AI could cause very large job losses by 2030, while others remain skeptical that such extreme outcomes are likely, underscoring that long‑term impacts remain unsettled. (news.com.au)

Because (1) the prediction is explicitly decadal, (2) only a tiny fraction of that period has elapsed, and (3) forward‑looking analyses still disagree about whether AI will mainly augment or substantially replace workers, there is not yet enough evidence to label the prediction as right or wrong. It is therefore too early to call.