There isn’t enough time yet to definitively judge this multi‑year prediction, although early data partly supports the described trends.

1. Capital concentration in a few top PE firms

• Industry data for 2020–2024 show that the six largest private‑equity firms raised about 60% of total PE funds, indicating strong concentration of new capital into a relatively small group of large managers.(visualcapitalist.com)
• Megafunds (>$5B) accounted for more than half of all PE capital raised in 2024, with large vehicles such as EQT X (~$23.7B) and Silver Lake Partners VII (~$20.5B) closing successfully even as overall fundraising slowed.(businessday.ng)
• At the same time, total global PE fundraising has declined in recent years, hitting multi‑year lows and reflecting tighter capital availability for the broader universe of PE managers.(businessday.ng)
  Taken together, this is directionally consistent with Chamath’s claim that money would move away from the broad PE universe and become more concentrated in a handful of top firms.

2. Shift into private credit

• Private credit assets under management have grown rapidly to around $1.7 trillion globally—more than triple their 2015 level—and private credit has become a major source of deal funding and corporate refinancing. Large asset managers and sovereign wealth funds are actively scaling private‑credit platforms (e.g., BlackRock’s proposed acquisition of HPS, TPG’s acquisition of Angelo Gordon, Abu Dhabi and Korea sovereign funds seeding or expanding private‑credit strategies).(pwc.com)
• News on Blue Owl and other managers highlights both the sector’s growth and emerging stresses (illiquidity concerns, fund‑structure backlash, some borrower defaults), but this is far from a clear consensus that a fully fledged “bubble” has formed and burst.(reuters.com)

3. Why the prediction is still inconclusive

• Chamath framed this as a process happening “over the coming years.” As of November 30, 2025, we are only about two months past the October 3, 2025 podcast date, so the full multi‑year trajectory he described has not yet played out.
• The direction of the trends (capital concentration in top PE firms and strong capital flows into private credit) matches current evidence, but the core evaluable claim—that private credit becomes “the next big bubble” (i.e., a speculative excess that later unwinds)—cannot yet be confirmed or falsified. The market has grown fast and drawn concern, but there has not been a decisive boom‑and‑bust event that would clearly validate or invalidate the “big bubble” characterization.

Because the structural shift he describes is multi‑year and the bubble aspect has not yet clearly materialized or burst, the fairest assessment as of late 2025 is inconclusive (too early) rather than definitively right or wrong.