Last updated Nov 29, 2025
aigovernmenteconomy
If U.S. AI regulation remains fragmented at the state level over the next several years, it will materially impede nationwide deployment of AI services by large providers (e.g., Google, OpenAI), harming U.S. consumers and slowing AI‑related job growth.
If we end up creating a patchwork of regulations on AI this early… having a patchwork of regulations on, for example, model development or telling software companies what software they can deploy would make it practically impossible for internet service providers like a Google or an OpenAI to service customers across state boundaries… This is a huge detriment to consumers and a huge detriment to the job market.View on YouTube
Explanation

The prediction explicitly concerns what will happen “over the next several years” if U.S. AI regulation remains a fragmented, state‑level patchwork. As of November 30, 2025, that time horizon has not elapsed, and both the regulatory structure and its long‑term economic effects are still evolving.

Current situation (late 2025):

  • The U.S. does not yet have a comprehensive federal AI statute; policy is a mix of federal executive actions (e.g., the 2023 AI Executive Order and subsequent guidance) plus growing state‑level laws and bills (such as state AI, data‑privacy, and automated decision‑making regulations).
  • Several states have passed or are considering AI‑related rules (e.g., focused on deepfakes, hiring algorithms, or sector‑specific uses), and commentators already describe this as an emerging “patchwork” of state AI and algorithmic regulations.
  • However, there is no clear, widely documented evidence yet that this patchwork has made it “practically impossible” for major providers like Google or OpenAI to serve customers across state lines, nor that it has materially harmed U.S. consumers or measurably slowed AI‑related job growth nationwide. Major AI services (e.g., large cloud AI platforms and popular consumer AI tools) remain broadly available across states, and AI‑related hiring and investment remain strong by late 2025.

Because:

  1. The specified timeframe (“over the next several years”) has not passed, and
  2. The conditional (“if regulation remains fragmented at the state level”) and outcome (nationwide, material impediment and job‑growth harm) concern medium‑ to long‑term structural effects that cannot yet be robustly measured,

it is too early to determine whether the prediction ultimately proves correct or incorrect.

So, based on evidence available by November 30, 2025, the accuracy of this prediction is inconclusive (too early to tell).