In late June 2025, a U.S.- and Qatar-mediated ceasefire formally ended the 12‑day Iran–Israel war, and subsequent reporting notes that while there were initial violations in the hours after it began, the ceasefire between Iran and Israel "ultimately held" and there have been no renewed large-scale direct missile exchanges between the two states. (en.wikipedia.org)

However, after the podcast date (28 June 2025), armed conflict clearly resumed via Iran‑aligned proxies. The Houthis in Yemen are widely described by governments and analysts as Iran‑backed and part of Tehran’s regional “Axis of Resistance.” (dw.com) Israel has conducted an ongoing air campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen since May 2025; this includes major strikes on Sanaa on 24 August 2025 and a series of attacks on 28 August 2025 that killed senior Houthi leadership, including de facto prime minister Ahmed al‑Rahawi and other top officials, in operations explicitly catalogued as “Israeli attacks on Yemen (May 2025–present)” directed at the Iran‑backed Houthis. (en.wikipedia.org)

The Houthis have hit Israel directly in response: on 7 September 2025, a drone launched from Yemen struck the arrivals hall of Israel’s Ramon Airport near Eilat, injuring civilians and briefly shutting the airport, and on 24 September 2025 another Houthi drone attack on central Eilat injured 22 people; both are documented as Houthi drone strikes on Israeli civilian infrastructure within the broader Red Sea crisis. (reuters.com) Separately, Israel has also escalated against Hezbollah, Iran’s principal Lebanese proxy: on 23 November 2025 it carried out an airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs that killed Hezbollah’s acting chief of staff Ali Tabtabai; Reuters explicitly describes Hezbollah in this piece as “Iran‑backed,” and the strike is noted as a serious escalation despite an existing U.S.-brokered truce on the Lebanon front. (reuters.com)

Taken together, these post‑ceasefire Israeli airstrikes on Iran‑backed groups (Houthis and Hezbollah) and the retaliatory drone attacks on Israeli territory constitute clear instances of renewed military and proxy clashes between Israel and Iran’s regional network after the June 2025 12‑day war, even though the formal Iran–Israel ceasefire has largely held at the state‑to‑state level. That matches the substance of Sacks’s prediction that “this is not over” and that the conflict would “flare up again at some point” through further armed or proxy confrontations; therefore the prediction is best judged as correct.