Evidence since April 2025 shows that the rare‑earths cutoff was directly addressed in U.S.–China trade talks and partially rolled back through formal agreements.

1. China did halt rare‑earth exports after the April 2025 tariffs. On April 4, 2025 China imposed export controls on seven categories of medium and heavy rare earths in response to U.S. tariffs, and reporting in early April noted that shipments of those rare earths effectively stopped, with exporters waiting indefinitely for licenses.(energynews.oedigital.com) This is the “cutoff” Sacks was referring to.

2. A formal trade agreement explicitly tied to rare earths was reached in June 2025. On June 11, 2025, Reuters reported that President Trump announced a new U.S.–China trade agreement under which China would supply the U.S. with magnets and rare‑earth minerals, while the U.S. kept 55% tariffs; the deal, framed as a trade truce, was described as lifting China’s export restrictions on rare earths, pending final approval by Trump and Xi.(reuters.com) A contemporaneous Gulf News analysis summarized the same London deal as committing China to provide “full magnets and any necessary rare earths” to the U.S., resuming exports after roughly two months of severe restrictions, via export permits for U.S. firms (valid for six months and renewable).(gulfnews.com) That is a formal, negotiated trade arrangement that explicitly addresses the rare‑earth cutoff.

3. That deal restored at least civilian U.S. access to Chinese rare earths. Industry and policy analyses describe this London agreement as a rare‑earths “deal” or truce that restarted flows of Chinese rare‑earth magnets to U.S. manufacturers, even while emphasizing it is temporary, license‑based, and leaves China with major leverage.(rareearthexchanges.com) These accounts stress that military‑grade magnets and some specialized rare‑earth products remain outside the fast‑track system, so access is partial and focused on non‑military uses rather than comprehensive.

4. Later negotiations reinforced (but did not fully liberalize) this framework. A subsequent deal after Trump–Xi talks in Busan on October 30, 2025 suspended a planned expansion of Chinese rare‑earth export controls for a year as part of a broader trade agreement, effectively preserving the existing flow regime rather than tightening it further.(en.wikipedia.org) U.S. and Chinese officials have since referred to a continuing, repeatedly extended truce under which lower tariffs and ongoing Chinese rare‑earth exports to the U.S. are maintained, while both sides argue over draft regulations that could re‑tighten controls.(uk.marketscreener.com)

5. Assessment relative to the prediction. Sacks’ normalized prediction was that the rare‑earth cutoff would be “explicitly resolved in a formal agreement, restoring US access to rare earth materials or processing from China.” That did occur in substance: rare‑earth exports were shut off in April, then explicitly addressed and partially rolled back in a negotiated London trade deal that committed China to resume supplying magnets and rare earths to the U.S., followed by later agreements that kept that flow going (though under restrictive licensing and with military‑grade items still constrained). The resolution is imperfect and fragile, but a formal agreement did explicitly restore significant U.S. access to Chinese rare‑earth materials. On that basis, the prediction is best judged as right (directionally correct, albeit with important caveats about scope and durability).