Key elements of Chamath’s scenario did not play out as described during the roughly nine‑month window after early 2025.

1. Trump administration did trigger a tariff‑driven market break, but it was brief. After Trump’s January 20, 2025 inauguration, his second administration rolled out sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs in late March/early April. This caused the April 2–10, 2025 stock market crash, with the S&P 500 dropping about 10% in two days and global equities shedding trillions in value, explicitly linked to Trump’s tariffs. (en.wikipedia.org) That satisfies the policy that cracks equity markets part of the premise.

2. There was a short‑lived flight to safety that pushed 10‑year yields briefly into his target band, but not in a sustained way. In the panic immediately after the tariff announcement, investors fled to Treasuries and the 10‑year yield fell into the high‑3% range (lows around 3.86–3.95%) for a few days in early April. (en.wikipedia.org) However, yields quickly snapped back: by mid‑April they were around 4.4–4.6%, and subsequent 10‑year auctions in April and July cleared at roughly 4.36–4.44%, not at 3–4%. (cnbc.com) There was no nine‑month window of persistently 3–4% 10‑year yields that Treasury could lean on.

3. The U.S. did not refinance anything close to $10 trillion at 3–4%, and interest costs are rising, not yielding “trillions” in savings. Analyses of the Treasury’s funding needs indicate about $3.1 trillion of debt maturing in 2025, not $10 trillion in the nine months after early 2025, and that refinancing has generally occurred at yields in the mid‑4% range, not locked‑in near 3%. (panewslab.com) Meanwhile, the national debt continued to climb—from around $37 trillion in August 2025 to $38 trillion by October—and interest payments are now over $1 trillion per year and projected around $14 trillion over the next decade, with rating agencies warning about worsening debt affordability. (apnews.com) This is the opposite of a clearly observable multi‑trillion interest‑saving windfall.

4. Consumption did not collapse; it was front‑loaded and then slowed modestly. Retail data show a surge in March 2025 as households accelerated purchases ahead of tariffs, followed by a much weaker but still positive April (+0.1% m/m), with core retail sales slightly down—but industry groups and Census‑based summaries repeatedly describe consumer spending as “steady” and “resilient,” not sharply depressed. (tradingeconomics.com) Later in 2025, retail sales growth cools and sentiment deteriorates, but September retail sales are still rising year‑on‑year and GDP growth remains solid, consistent with a gradual squeeze rather than a deliberate, deep consumption shock. (reuters.com)

5. Inflation eased slightly, but tariffs are seen as adding upward pressure, not as a “deflationary tactic.” By April 2025, PCE inflation had fallen to about 2.1% year‑over‑year from 2.6% at end‑2024, part of an ongoing disinflation trend that began before Trump’s new tariffs. (federalreserve.gov) Federal Reserve and Treasury reports explicitly warn that the new import tariffs are likely to raise goods prices and have already contributed to an upturn in core goods inflation. (federalreserve.gov) By late 2025, CPI inflation is running around 3%, still above the Fed’s 2% target, with tariffs cited as one of the drivers of elevated prices. (theguardian.com) This does not match a “materially reduced inflation via equity‑market rebasing” story.

Taken together: while Trump’s tariff shock did crack equity markets and briefly pull 10‑year yields into the high‑3% range, the core claims—that this would sustainably depress consumption and inflation and allow roughly $10 trillion of debt to be refinanced at 3–4% yields, saving “trillions” in interest—have not occurred and are contradicted by observed borrowing costs, debt dynamics, inflation behavior, and spending data. Therefore this prediction is wrong.