Evidence to date lines up closely with Friedberg’s forecast on both the debt‑refinancing and stock‑market‑tolerance components.

1. Context: Trump 2.0 and Bessent in key roles. Donald Trump began his second, non‑consecutive term as president on January 20, 2025, and Scott Bessent was confirmed as Treasury secretary later that month, matching Friedberg’s assumption that “Bessent and others” would hold key economic posts in a new Trump administration. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. Massive near‑term refinancing need (~$10–11T). Treasury’s Office of Debt Management reported in mid‑2025 that about 31.4% of the roughly $36 trillion federal debt would mature within the following 12 months, meaning about $11 trillion in U.S. debt securities must be refinanced—almost exactly the “$10 trillion coming due in the next 12 months” Friedberg referenced. (foxbusiness.com) This refinancing window overlaps the 12‑month period he was talking about (roughly March 2025–March 2026).

3. Administration actively trying to push rates down around that refinancing. Early in the term, Bessent said the Trump administration’s focus was on keeping longer‑term Treasury yields (especially the 10‑year) low, rather than directly browbeating the Fed, and confirmed that “the president wants lower rates,” aiming to get borrowing costs down via deregulation, spending cuts, and energy policy. (cnbc.com) As the year progressed and the refinancing wave loomed, Trump repeatedly demanded deep Fed cuts, arguing publicly that the policy rate was at least 3 percentage points too high and that each percentage point was costing the government roughly $360 billion per year in refinancing costs—explicitly tying his push for lower rates to the cost of rolling the debt. (reuters.com) Bessent later stated that the Fed’s rate was “significantly higher than necessary” and called for a series of cuts totaling about 150–175 basis points, while also emphasizing that rising tariff revenues should be used to reduce debt and that rate cuts would ease pressure on rate‑sensitive sectors. (upi.com) Together with Treasury’s own acknowledgment that roughly $11T must be refinanced over a one‑year horizon, this amounts to exactly the sort of strategy Friedberg described: using political and policy pressure to push interest rates down during a huge refinancing window.

4. More willingness than in term one to tolerate stock‑market weakness. In his first term, Trump frequently treated record stock prices as a core metric of success and regularly highlighted market gains. (en.wikipedia.org) In 2025, by contrast, he pressed ahead with his sweeping "Liberation Day" tariff program even as it triggered the largest U.S. stock‑market crash since the pandemic and the worst first‑100‑days market performance for any president since Gerald Ford, with the S&P 500 down over 7% and trillions in equity value temporarily wiped out. (en.wikipedia.org) Investment research notes from March 2025 observed that markets were starting to question the old “Trump put,” explicitly commenting that the new administration appeared willing to tolerate a “temporary disturbance” in economic activity and equity prices to pursue its policy agenda. (ubs.com) During sell‑offs, Trump himself said that while he didn’t want stocks down, “sometimes you have to take medicine to fix something,” and he openly acknowledged the risk of a recession, signaling acceptance of short‑term market and economic pain. (reddit.com) This behavior is widely described by market commentators as a shift from his first term, when he was more visibly reactive to market declines.

5. Linking both elements together. Commentary on the 2025 crash and tariff shock notes that some investors even speculated Trump might be willing to endure market turmoil in order to force or justify easier monetary policy, though he denied doing it "on purpose." (reuters.com) At the same time, reputable financial and policy outlets tied Trump’s and Bessent’s aggressive calls for lower rates directly to the government’s need to refinance an ~$11 trillion debt wall and reduce exploding interest costs. (foxbusiness.com) This is closely aligned with Friedberg’s thesis that Trump 2.0 would be more willing than before to look past short‑term stock‑market "rumblings" in order to get rates down and refinance the debt on more favorable terms.

Given the documented combination of (a) an explicit, sustained push from Trump and Bessent to lower interest rates precisely as a massive ~$10–11T refinancing wave hits, and (b) a noticeably greater tolerance for equity‑market drawdowns compared with his first term, Friedberg’s prediction has, by late 2025—well within his 12‑month horizon—substantially come true.