these new systems, which we highlighted on the show a couple of months ago, like the pebble bed reactor that's been in production, making electricity in China are incredible new technology architectures. And they're here and they're running and China's rolling out dozens or hundreds of these. And the United States is rolling out zero. And that needs to change. And I think we only have a couple of months to get the engine stood up that will allow us to make the material that will allow us to make the production technology needed to actually deploy these stations, to try and have a shot at catching up. And if we don't, we're going to be hugely disadvantaged on an energy cost basis. We're going to be hugely disadvantaged on an ability to actually deploy AI technology competitively.View on YouTube
The prediction’s key outcome is that “over the coming decade” (i.e., roughly 2025–2035) the U.S. will be severely disadvantaged relative to China in electricity costs and in its ability to deploy AI competitively, if it fails within a few months of January 2025 to stand up an industrial and regulatory engine for advanced nuclear (e.g., pebble‑bed) deployment.
As of November 30, 2025, fewer than two years of that ~10‑year window have elapsed. Even if we try to assess the antecedent (whether the U.S. has meaningfully “stood up” such an engine), the prediction’s actual claim is about the resulting disadvantage over the decade, which cannot yet be measured: relative electricity costs and AI competitiveness vs. China will depend on policy, build‑out, technology and market evolution through the early‑to‑mid 2030s.
Because the timeframe of the forecast extends well beyond the current date, there is not enough observable data yet to determine whether the U.S. will in fact end up “hugely disadvantaged” in the specified ways. Therefore the correctness of the prediction cannot currently be evaluated.