As of November 30, 2025, the key conditions in Chamath’s prediction have not materialized, but the time horizon is long-term and climate/ice trends still point in the direction he describes, so it’s too early to definitively call it right or wrong.

Relevant facts:

• Arctic ice is melting rapidly, increasing theoretical access to northern routes. Winter 2025 Arctic sea ice hit a record-low maximum extent in the satellite era, reflecting strong warming-driven decline. (theguardian.com)

• Arctic shipping remains niche compared with the Panama Canal. Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) – the most developed Arctic corridor – carried about 37.9 million tonnes of cargo in 2024. (en.wikipedia.org) By contrast, the Panama Canal moved roughly 423 million tons in FY 2024, more than ten times as much, and is projected around 500+ million tons in FY 2025. (pancanal.com) A 2024/25 analysis notes that the Arctic Northern Sea Route has not become a mainstream container path: only a few specialist operators (mainly Russian/Chinese) use it, and total Arctic transit freight is tiny compared with Suez and Panama. (ft.com)

• The Northwest Passage / “Northern Passage” Chamath is likely referring to is still seasonal, risky, and lightly used. Contemporary briefs emphasize that the Northwest Passage is only navigable for a short summer window, requires ice-capable ships or icebreaker support, and is not yet a reliable, year‑round route for regular trade. (arctictradenations.com) Recent research even finds the effective shipping season shrunk between 2007 and 2021 due to shifts in multi‑year ice, undercutting the idea of an already “easy” lane. (natureworldnews.com) A 2025 survey of Canada–US disputes notes that there are still fewer than ~20 full transits per year, mostly expedition cruises, underscoring that this is not a major corridor for “a lot of critical goods.” (grokipedia.com)

• The U.S. does not have a Greenland–Canada arrangement that would give it near‑monopoly control. Greenland remains part of the Kingdom of Denmark; Danish and Greenlandic leaders have repeatedly rejected U.S. acquisition or expanded control, and current U.S. presence is limited to the long‑standing Pituffik (Thule) base under a defense agreement with Denmark. (reuters.com) On the Canadian side, the legal status of the Northwest Passage remains unresolved: Canada insists it is internal waters; the U.S. treats it as an international strait. Both sides “agree to disagree” under the 1988 Arctic Cooperation Agreement, and no new framework has been created that would hand the U.S. near‑exclusive control of the passage. (belfercenter.org)

• Other actors, especially Russia, already exert strong control over alternative Arctic routes. Russia legally treats the Northern Sea Route as a national transport corridor, requires permits and often Russian icebreaker/pilot services for passage, and even reserves key energy shipments for Russian‑flag vessels. (cleanarctic.org) This makes any future Arctic shipping system inherently multipolar, not something the U.S. could easily dominate even if it had deeper arrangements with Canada and Greenland.

Putting this together:

• The premise that climate change is opening Arctic navigation opportunities is strongly supported.
• The core prediction, though, is that this will yield a commercially vital “Northern Passage” whose importance rivals the Panama Canal and over which the U.S., via Greenland/Canada agreements, would have near‑monopoly strategic control.
• As of late 2025, the route is still marginal, seasonal, and legally contested, with no U.S. monopoly and cargo volumes far below canal levels.

Because Chamath did not attach a specific time frame and many projections place substantial Arctic shipping growth and potential canal‑like significance closer to mid‑century, the current evidence shows that his scenario has not happened yet, but also has not been ruled out by events. On that basis, the fairest assessment today is:

Inconclusive (too early to tell).