The prediction is framed as a multi‑year structural claim (“over the coming years” the ultimate burden will fall predominantly on taxpayers), but less than a year has passed since the Jan 11, 2025 episode, so it’s too early to evaluate how the cost-sharing equilibrium will ultimately settle.

Current evidence is mixed:

• Historical analyses show that in some years taxpayers already shouldered a very large share of climate‑disaster costs. For example, for 2012, NRDC estimated that private insurers covered only about 25% of climate‑related disaster damages, with the U.S. government paying more than three times as much as private insurers, implying a heavy taxpayer burden in that year.​ (nrdc.org)
• But more recent, disaggregated work from the Federal Reserve on 2021 U.S. disaster damages (~$153B) finds the largest share was borne by property insurers (48%), followed by uninsured/underinsured owners and businesses (37%), while federal government (11%) plus state/local (4%) together accounted for about 15%—well short of a taxpayer‑dominant share.​ (federalreserve.gov)
• For 1H 2025, Aon data summarized by PreventionWeb indicate that a majority of weather‑related losses were absorbed by insurers, with the global insurance protection gap at a record low ~38%, meaning insured losses exceeded uninsured ones; the U.S. drove much of this result. This again suggests insurers, not taxpayers, were carrying most direct financial losses in that period.​ (preventionweb.net)
• A Bloomberg Intelligence analysis (reported mid‑2025) notes that federal spending previously covered up to about one‑third of climate‑related costs but has recently fallen to around 2%, implying the federal taxpayer share, at least in that metric, has declined rather than moved toward dominance.​ (insurancejournal.com)

These data show that (a) taxpayers already sometimes bear very large costs, and (b) in the last few years, insurers and uninsured owners have generally borne larger direct loss shares than government. But because the prediction is explicitly about how the balance will evolve over the coming years, and cost-sharing is still in flux, there is not yet enough elapsed time or clear directional evidence to say that taxpayers will ultimately bear the predominant share. As of Nov 30, 2025, the claim cannot be decisively judged, so the outcome is inconclusive (too early).