Donald Trump did in fact win the November 5, 2024 U.S. presidential election, defeating Kamala Harris with 312 electoral votes to 226 and winning the popular vote roughly 49.8% to 48.3%. (en.wikipedia.org) This means Jason’s stated view that there was a “pretty good” / better‑than‑even chance Trump would win ended up aligned with the actual outcome.

On the mechanism, post‑election analyses show that pre‑election polling once again slightly underestimated Trump’s support by about 2–3 percentage points nationally and in key swing states, generally biasing toward the Democrat. (theguardian.com) Explanations emphasize things like nonresponse bias and turnout modeling problems—Trump‑leaning voters being less likely to answer or complete polls, or breaking late toward Trump—rather than clear evidence of large numbers of voters actively lying to pollsters. (pewresearch.org) That pattern is at least directionally consistent with Jason’s idea that some Trump supporters were not fully visible in polling or social circles, though experts still debate how big a classic “shy Trump” (social‑desirability) effect really is.

Because the core, checkable part of the prediction—Trump having a strong chance and ultimately winning in November 2024—came true, and the claimed existence of a non‑open Trump‑supporting bloc is broadly consistent with the observed, modest undercount of Trump in polls (even if the exact cause is disputed), the fairest overall judgment is that this prediction was right.