As of 30 November 2025, Ukraine has not experienced the kind of overall military or state collapse that Sacks predicted for “probably next year” (i.e., 2025). The Ukrainian state and armed forces remain intact and are still conducting defensive and limited offensive operations along an ~800‑mile front, including around Kupiansk and Pokrovsk, despite heavy pressure and serious manpower shortages.

For example, late‑November reporting notes that Ukrainian forces continue to defend Kupiansk and conduct operations against Russian troops there, contradicting Russian claims of full control. Ukrainian units are also still contesting Russian advances around Pokrovsk and reinforcing other sectors such as Zaporizhzhia, indicating a strained but functioning defense rather than systemic collapse. (reuters.com)

Major analyses of the 2025 campaign likewise describe Russia achieving incremental territorial gains at high cost, not a decisive breakdown of Ukrainian lines. A late‑November Washington Post assessment explicitly states that Russia’s leadership had bet on a collapse of Ukrainian defenses along the front, but that this collapse had not occurred as of late 2025. (washingtonpost.com) Other reporting similarly portrays Russia fighting for limited blocks of small towns over many months, rather than exploiting any large‑scale Ukrainian rout. (businessinsider.com)

Regarding the Kursk offensive, subsequent analysis does support part of Sacks’s concern: the cross‑border incursion is widely judged to have been strategically costly for Ukraine, tying down elite units in Kursk while Ukraine faced acute manpower shortages on other fronts, and contributing to Russian gains and increased risk of local front collapse in eastern Ukraine. (en.wikipedia.org) However, even critical analysts frame this as worsening Ukraine’s position and raising the risk of collapse, not as having already produced the nationwide military collapse Sacks forecast.

Because Sacks’s prediction was time‑bounded to “probably next year” and 2025 is not yet over on the evaluation date (30 November 2025), it is too early to say with certainty that a collapse will not occur by the end of the year. At the same time, existing evidence up to late November shows no Ukrainian military collapse despite severe strain. Given that the deadline he named (the end of 2025) has not fully elapsed, the fairest classification under your schema is “inconclusive (too early)”: the prediction has clearly not come true so far, but the full time window he specified has not yet closed.