Last updated Nov 29, 2025
markets
If market volatility remains relatively low and conditions do not change materially, equity-trading algorithms will mechanically sell approximately $160 billion of global equities over the following month (from early August 2024), which will in turn induce additional selling of several hundred billion dollars more by other market participants, leading to continued net selling pressure in equity markets over that period.
right now, if there's relatively minimal volatility and not much changes, the algorithms will have to sell another 160 odd billion dollars of equity, and that'll pull through many hundred billions more from everybody else. So I think we're in a little bit of a delicate moment where the preponderance of the market action will be to continue to sellView on YouTube
Explanation

Chamath’s claim was that, over roughly the month after early August 2024, equity‑trading algorithms would mechanically have to sell about $160B of global equities, which would then induce “many hundreds of billions” more in selling by others, so that “the preponderance of the market action will be to continue to sell.”

What actually happened in that period looks inconsistent with that scenario:

  1. Global equity prices rose meaningfully over the forecast window. The MSCI ACWI index gained about 2.6% in August 2024 and another 2.7% in September 2024, indicating broad-based equity appreciation rather than sustained net selling pressure. (statmuse.com) The S&P 500 was similarly up ~2% in August and ~2.5% in September 2024, again suggesting buyers, not persistent forced sellers, dominated. (statmuse.com) It is hard to reconcile a month-long, multi‑hundred‑billion mechanical equity dump with globally rising equity indices and no corresponding prolonged drawdown.

  2. Fund‑flow data show net inflows into equities over much of that month, not large net outflows. In the week around the initial yen‑carry shock (reported August 9), global equity funds did see outflows of about $6.3B, with nearly $99B rushing into money‑market funds amid the volatility spike. (reuters.com) But a Reuters/LSEG piece on September 6 noted that the week to September 4 was the first weekly global‑equity outflow in four weeks, implying the prior three weeks (i.e., most of August after the shock) had net inflows into equity funds. (y94.com) Separately, the Financial Times reported that ETF flows hit a record in August 2024 with about $129.7B of net inflows, and equity ETFs saw strong buying, which is the opposite of a market dominated by mechanical equity selling. (ft.com) Together, these flow data contradict the idea that the “preponderance” of activity in that month was forced equity liquidation on the scale Chamath described.

  3. Market behavior quickly flipped from a forced‑selling shock to a strong rebound. A yen‑driven meltdown and CTA deleveraging did occur: Goldman Sachs’ Scott Rubner estimated that systematic strategies had already dumped roughly $109B of global equity futures in the month up to mid‑August, and expected some continued selling into autumn. (investing.com) However, within that same mid‑August period, global stocks logged their strongest weekly performance since November 2023, with the S&P 500 up about 3.9% for the week, the MSCI World having its best week since early November, and volatility (VIX) dropping back down. (ft.com) That pattern—rapid rebound, easing volatility, and strong weekly gains—is inconsistent with a month‑long dominance of algorithm‑driven selling.

We do see some systematic selling and rebalancing (CTAs’ $109B unwind, later pension and 401(k) re‑allocations out of equities), but public data do not support Chamath’s much larger, specific claim that algorithms had to sell another $160B in equities over the following month and thereby pull through “many hundreds of billions” more in net selling, nor his conclusion that selling would dominate market action over that entire period. Instead, prices and flows suggest that after an initial shock, net buying and recovery characterized most of that month.

Given the available evidence, the prediction that equity markets would experience continued, large, mechanically driven net selling on the order he specified over the subsequent month did not materialize, so this forecast is best classified as wrong.