The prediction explicitly covers “the next couple of years” after June 2024, i.e., roughly through mid‑2026. As of now (late November 2025) that window has not finished, so the forecast period is still in progress.

Available data are also mixed relative to the normalized claim:

• Headcount levels: Global employment is still growing rather than flat. The ILO’s World Employment and Social Outlook updates project tens of millions of net new jobs in 2024–2025 and forecast employment growth of around 1.5–1.7% per year, not a plateau in aggregate headcount. (ilo.org) At the same time, some large firms (e.g., HP and other tech companies) are cutting thousands of jobs partly in connection with AI‑driven restructuring, showing that at least some organizations are not keeping headcount flat. (sfchronicle.com) But these aggregate and anecdotal data don’t tell us whether “most” individual organizations have been roughly flat versus modestly expanding.
• Per‑employee productivity from AI: There is credible evidence of productivity gains from AI tools in specific domains—e.g., a 2024 study on GitHub Copilot finds around a 5–6% increase in individual and project‑level productivity for open‑source software development. (arxiv.org) However, it’s not yet clear to what extent such gains have scaled across most organizations or translated into broad, “notably higher” organizational efficiency at the economy‑wide level.

Because (1) the stated time horizon has not yet elapsed, and (2) current evidence does not cleanly confirm or falsify the precise combination of flat headcount for most organizations plus significantly higher per‑employee productivity from AI, the prediction cannot yet be definitively judged. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early).