As of late 2025, the prediction looks directionally consistent with the data so far, but the stated time horizon (“over the coming years of the AI-driven productivity boom”) clearly extends beyond the ~18 months since May 2024, so it’s too early to call it definitively right or wrong.

On unemployment: The U.S. unemployment rate did rise modestly from around 3.8% in late 2023 to an average of about 4.2% in Q4 2024, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but remained in what economists generally consider a historically low range. (bls.gov) By September–October 2025, estimates put unemployment around 4.3–4.4%, a four‑year high but still low compared with past recessions and still among the lowest rates in the G7. (ft.com) Weekly jobless claims in November 2025 are at a seven‑month low, indicating layoffs remain subdued even as hiring slows. (reuters.com) So there has been no surge into high unemployment or “widespread joblessness” so far.

On “more companies”: New business formation has remained unusually strong. The U.S. saw about 5.21 million business applications in 2024, after a record 5.48 million in 2023, both far above the ~3.5 million pre‑pandemic level. (finder.com) Through 2025 to date, applications are slightly up relative to the same period in 2024, suggesting continued elevated entrepreneurial activity. (finder.com) This supports the idea that adjustment so far has included a large number of (often small) new firms rather than a collapse in employment.

However, because the claim was about the entire AI‑driven boom over “the coming years,” and structural effects of AI on labor markets can take several years to fully manifest, the available data window is too short to conclusively validate or falsify the long‑run prediction. Hence the classification: inconclusive (too early).