1. Telegram has not been targeted under the new “foreign‑adversary app” authority.
   The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA) was enacted in April 2024 and explicitly targets ByteDance/TikTok and its subsidiaries as “foreign adversary controlled applications,” while creating a process to designate other apps in the future. As of late 2025, public descriptions of the law and its enforcement still identify only TikTok/ByteDance as covered by the statute; there is no record of Telegram being designated or restricted under PAFACA or a similar federal foreign‑app authority. (en.wikipedia.org)

   There have been other actions involving Telegram—e.g., France’s criminal investigation of CEO Pavel Durov, Ukraine and some U.S. states (like Montana) restricting Telegram on government devices—but these are unrelated to PAFACA and do not amount to a U.S. federal ban or material nationwide restriction of Telegram under the new foreign‑controlled‑app framework sacks was discussing. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. The conditional part of the forecast (“if Biden wins a second term…they will set their gunsights on X”) cannot occur, because Biden did not win a second term.
   The 2024 U.S. presidential election was won by Donald Trump, who was inaugurated as the 47th president on January 20, 2025. (en.wikipedia.org) Since Biden is no longer president and does not hold a 2025–2029 term, the specific scenario sacks described—Biden using this authority in a second term to pressure Elon Musk to divest or curtail X—has been precluded by events.

3. No evidence of U.S. authorities using this authority to pressure Musk to divest X.
   Public reporting through November 30, 2025 shows no instance of the U.S. government invoking PAFACA or a similar “foreign adversary controlled applications” power against X (Twitter) or Elon Musk. Legal and regulatory actions involving Musk in this period—such as the SEC’s securities‑disclosure lawsuit about his 2022 Twitter acquisition—concern securities law and data‑access issues, not foreign‑controlled‑app national‑security powers or forced divestiture of X. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because: (a) Telegram has not been the first major target of the new foreign‑controlled‑app authority, and (b) the Biden‑second‑term condition for the later X‑related enforcement never materialized—and there is no sign of such enforcement against X under that authority—the prediction about the sequence of enforcement is best evaluated as wrong in light of actual developments to date.