Google fires protestors, NPR chaos, Humane's AI Pin, Startup tax crisis, sports betting scandal

Friedberg’s on-air statement was:

“we had within 72 hours, I think, more applications than we have seats… And in the next week, we’ll start to respond to people… it’s going to be done in order of when it’s received. And they’re going to start processing applications this week.” (podscripts.co)

Key pieces to verify:

1. Timing – “in the next week we’ll start to respond / start processing applications this week.”
   • The episode is dated April 19, 2024, so this implies initial responses and processing should begin roughly by April 26, 2024. (podscripts.co)
   • A Reddit thread from May 9, 2024 shows at least one applicant saying they had not heard back yet, but another commenter says they have seen people on X (Twitter) who “have been accepted and paid the admission fee,” indicating some acceptances were going out by early May. (reddit.com)
   • Public web data (tweets, posts, press) does not clearly show when the very first acceptance emails went out, only that some people were accepted by May 9. That’s consistent with the prediction but doesn’t prove responses actually started within the specific one‑week window after April 19.

2. Oversubscription claim – “within 72 hours… more applications than we have seats.”
   • There is no independent public reporting that confirms or refutes the exact 72‑hour oversubscription metric. Later coverage simply notes the All‑In Summit is an invite‑only, sold‑out conference with around 1,800–1,950 attendees paying about $7,500 each in 2024, which is compatible with strong demand but not specific enough to verify the 72‑hour detail. (en.wikipedia.org)

3. Processing “in order of when it’s received.”
   • The application and review process is run privately by the organizers; available anecdotes (e.g., some applicants waiting while others are already admitted) don’t establish whether they actually followed strict first‑come‑first‑served ordering or made exceptions (e.g., sponsors, VIPs, scholarships). (reddit.com)

Because:

• The relevant actions (exact start date of responses and internal processing order) happen entirely inside a private system; and
• Public traces only show that some acceptances existed by May 9, 2024, without pinning down when processing began or how strictly ordering was followed,

there isn’t enough verifiable external evidence to say the prediction was clearly correct or clearly wrong. It can’t be determined even though the event is long past, so the appropriate classification is “ambiguous.”

The transcript of the April 19, 2024 episode confirms Friedberg saying about All‑In Summit speakers: “In a week, we’ll announce a bunch together,” during the summit update segment. (podscripts.co) Earlier, the April 12 episode described All‑In Summit 2024 and explicitly noted that a lineup of notable speakers was still “to be announced,” so a first speaker list had not yet been made public by then. (allin.onpodcastai.com) However, in searching news coverage, blogs, the All‑In / All‑In Summit web pages, and later episode summaries and transcripts, I can find no dated record of a public “batch” announcement of confirmed 2024 Summit speakers around a week later (roughly April 26, 2024). (en.wikipedia.org) Those sources do confirm the summit, its dates, and a long list of ultimate speakers, but none specify when the initial speaker cohort was publicly announced. (en.wikipedia.org) Because such an announcement could have been made via channels that are not well indexed (e.g., email blasts or certain social posts) and I cannot find clear evidence either that it happened on the stated timeline or that it did not, the accuracy of the prediction cannot be determined from available public records.

The prediction is explicitly framed as a long‑term, historical judgment (“in the fullness of time… Israel’s Vietnam”), i.e., years to decades after the 2023–24 Gaza war. As of the evaluation date (30 Nov 2025), only about a year and a half has passed since the war began and the podcast aired, and the war itself is still ongoing with major uncertainty over its end state and political consequences. Current writing and polling therefore reflect contemporary opinion, not the eventual “historical consensus” the predictor is talking about.

On the "Israel’s Vietnam" analogy: a number of commentators and activists have used that framing or asked whether Gaza could become “Israel’s Vietnam,” but these are individual opinions and polemics, not any kind of settled consensus among historians or the broader public.(revolucion.org.es) The main encyclopedic treatments of the conflict still describe it in more neutral, descriptive terms and emphasize that it remains ongoing with evolving regional and international repercussions, which by definition means a stable retrospective judgment has not yet formed.(en.wikipedia.org)

On public sympathy for anti‑war protesters (e.g., students, tech workers): available polling during and shortly after the first big protest waves shows a sharply divided public, not an overwhelming or settled sympathy. For example, U.S. polls around the 2024 university Gaza encampments found roughly 28–40% of Americans supporting the protests and 42–47% opposing them; college students were more supportive (around 45% support), but the country as a whole was mixed and polarized.(en.wikipedia.org) That tells us how they’re seen now, not how they’ll be seen “in the fullness of time.”

Because:

• the predictor’s own time horizon is multi‑year to multi‑decade;
• the war and its political aftermath are still in flux; and
• existing data only speaks to short‑term, contested public opinion,

there is not yet enough information to say whether the Gaza war will ultimately be remembered as “Israel’s Vietnam” or whether today’s protesters will be broadly and historically re‑cast as sympathetic figures. The correct assessment at this point is therefore “inconclusive (too early)” rather than right or wrong.

Chamath’s prediction had two parts: (1) that attention to Google’s Project Nimbus controversy would fade within a week, and (2) that the contract would not be canceled.

1. Media/public attention within a week
The episode was released April 19, 2024, so “a week from now” is roughly through April 26, 2024. In that period and immediately after:

• The Alphabet Workers Union issued an updated press release on April 25, 2024, specifically about the Project Nimbus protests and firings, keeping the story in the news and in worker organizing. (alphabetworkersunion.org)
• On April 27, 2024, The Guardian ran a high‑profile piece, “Workers accuse Google of ‘tantrum’ after 50 fired over Israel contract protest,” centered on the Project Nimbus contract and the protests around it. (theguardian.com)
• Coverage of No Tech for Apartheid and Project Nimbus continued beyond that week; the campaign’s own history and later reporting document the April 16 sit‑ins, subsequent firings, and ongoing organizing specifically aimed at ending Project Nimbus. (en.wikipedia.org)

This shows the issue did not quickly disappear from public or media attention within a week; coverage and activism continued and even escalated shortly after his time window.

2. Whether Project Nimbus was canceled
As of late 2025, Project Nimbus remains in force:

• A 2025 joint investigation by The Guardian, +972 Magazine, and Local Call analyzes leaked documents from the still‑active Nimbus contract, revealing secret provisions and confirming the deal’s ongoing status. (theguardian.com)
• In 2025, Alphabet shareholders are being asked to vote on a proposal about the human‑rights implications of its products “particularly those used in Israel’s Project Nimbus”; both Alphabet’s board and external groups discuss Nimbus as an existing contract, not a canceled one. (nypost.com)

There is no credible reporting that Nimbus was canceled due to the 2024 protests; instead, it has remained operational and a continuing source of controversy.

Overall assessment

• Wrong on the time‑bound prediction that “in a week from now, everybody will forget what Project Nimbus is,” since coverage and organizing clearly persisted and even intensified beyond that week. (theguardian.com)
• Right that Project Nimbus was not canceled as a result of those protests. (theguardian.com)

Because the emphatic, falsifiable part of the prediction (rapid disappearance of attention within a week) did not occur, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong, even though the non‑cancellation component turned out to be accurate.

• In mid‑2025, federal support for public broadcasting was effectively eliminated: the Rescissions Act of 2025 rescinded $1.1 billion in funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), the main federal funding conduit for NPR and PBS, and was signed into law on July 24, 2025. (en.wikipedia.org) CPB then announced it would wind down and shut its doors because its federal budget had been zeroed out. (arstechnica.com) This satisfies the prediction’s condition that U.S. government funding for NPR be (for all practical purposes) eliminated.

• Despite that loss of federal funding, NPR has continued to operate as a national news organization. Coverage asking whether NPR would “go away” after CPB’s shutdown explicitly concludes that NPR “will still continue to operate,” while warning that the real damage will fall on smaller and rural member stations. (forbes.com) NPR’s CEO Katherine Maher similarly frames the crisis as forcing budget cuts and restructuring, not closure of NPR itself. (washingtonpost.com)

• Post‑cut reporting emphasizes that NPR and PBS are responding by ramping up private funding mechanisms—member donations, pledge drives, and other non‑government support—to compensate for the loss of CPB money. (forbes.com) That is precisely the dynamic the prediction described (subscriptions/donations sustaining the organization rather than it shutting down).

Given that (1) federal public‑media appropriations have been effectively removed and CPB is shutting down, yet (2) NPR has not “gone away” and is instead trying to sustain itself through private revenue and intensified fundraising, the prediction that NPR would continue to operate even if U.S. government funding were eliminated has, so far, proven right.

As of November 30, 2025, there isn’t enough evidence yet to say that social norms have clearly shifted in the way Chamath predicts.

On the "intrusive" social interfaces side:

• AI smart glasses and related wearables are growing quickly from a small base. Ray‑Ban Meta smart glasses have sold over 2 million units since late 2023, and global smart‑glasses shipments grew ~200% in 2024; AI smart glasses made up the majority of shipments by 2025, with vendors planning to scale production dramatically through 2026–2029. (counterpointresearch.com)
• Meta’s newer Ray‑Ban Display glasses add a wristband that tracks hand movements so users can control apps via gestures—exactly the kind of gestural interface he’s skeptical about—and U.S. smart‑glasses sales tripled in 2025, even if the category is still niche and faces price/privacy concerns. (reuters.com)
• Brands are actively normalizing these devices in social and cultural venues (e.g., fashion shows and experiential pop‑ups, including an immersive Ray‑Ban Meta installation that was remounted for events like Cannes and Coachella), which suggests ongoing experimentation with them in group social environments rather than a clear rejection. (fashionista.com)

At the same time, there is evidence of pushback and discomfort:

• Humane’s screenless, clip‑on AI Pin—an archetype of a conspicuous, always‑on AI wearable—was a commercial and usability failure, drawing very negative reviews and high return rates, and was shut down less than a year after launch, with services ending in February 2025. (theverge.com)
• Camera‑equipped smart glasses are provoking privacy backlash, especially among Gen Z, with viral incidents and coverage emphasizing fears of being recorded without consent in everyday life, even though the devices include indicator lights. (washingtonpost.com)
• Bulky headsets like Apple Vision Pro still provoke social awkwardness in public; many users report feeling they’re not yet socially acceptable outside controlled contexts (home, planes, some work environments), which points to limits on how far obviously isolating wearables can go in shared spaces. (en.wikipedia.org)

On the "passive/utility" wearables side, his view matches current trends but that trend long predates the prediction:

• Fitness trackers, smartwatches, and similar bands are a very large and fast‑growing market, with tens of billions in annual revenue and strong projected growth into the 2030s. (fortunebusinessinsights.com)
• Continuous glucose monitors and metabolic‑health wearables are expanding rapidly into both clinical and consumer segments (e.g., Abbott’s Lingo CGM moving into Walmart retail, DexCom’s extended‑wear CGMs, and integrations between CGMs and wearables like the Oura Ring). (reuters.com)
  These devices are generally accepted in daily life, which is consistent with his claim that "band" and health‑oriented wearables retain social value.

However, the core of his prediction is about future social norms “over the coming years” in group social environments (e.g., concerts/festivals) decisively turning against socially intrusive, gestural interfaces—people “ripping the devices off” and choosing to participate without them. As of ~1.5 years after the prediction:

• Intrusive/AI wearables are still in the early‑adoption phase; their market is growing, not shrinking, but remains niche.
• Norms around when and where they’re acceptable are still forming and are clearly contested (privacy backlash vs. growing curiosity and early mainstream marketing).
• There is no clear empirical evidence yet that, at scale, people at concerts/festivals are either broadly rejecting or fully embracing these interfaces; we mostly see experiments, marketing pushes, and scattered anecdotes rather than stable norms.

Because (1) the stated horizon is multi‑year, (2) adoption and backlash are both increasing from a small base, and (3) large‑scale social norms in the specific settings he mentions (concerts, festivals) are not yet well‑established in the data, it’s too early to judge the prediction as clearly right or wrong. Hence: inconclusive.

The prediction explicitly concerns a multi-decade horizon and claims the trend toward tighter human–computer integration (wearables, AR, brain–computer interfaces, etc.) is irreversible and will not reverse "over the long term." As of late 2025, only ~1.5 years have passed since the statement, far too short to determine whether a claimed irreversible, multi-decade trend will never reverse.

Current evidence does show continued growth in several relevant categories—e.g., global smartwatch and wearable shipments have generally risen year‑over‑year, major firms are still investing heavily in AR/VR platforms, and research and early products in brain–computer interfaces are ongoing—but these are still early in their adoption curves and subject to future technological, social, regulatory, or economic shifts that could alter or reverse the long‑term trajectory. Because the claim is about permanence of the trend over decades, and we have not yet observed anything close to that timeframe, it cannot be definitively judged right or wrong at this point.

Parts of the prediction track reality, but the central Apple‑glasses element has not come true and now effectively cannot.

What came true:

• Humane’s AI Pin was marketed as a phone-replacement wearable and launched in April 2024, but it was panned for poor performance, short battery life, and usability problems, and never came close to replacing smartphones in practice.(cnbc.com) By early 2025, Humane sold most of its assets to HP, halted sales of the Pin, and announced that cloud features (calling, messaging, AI queries) would shut off on February 28, 2025, effectively killing the product.(theverge.com) So its “prospects as a standalone replacement for the phone” were indeed very limited.
• During the Pin’s short life, multiple other computer‑vision wearables emerged or scaled up. Meta’s Ray‑Ban smart glasses line (with cameras and Meta AI) launched in 2023 and, by 2025, had sold over 2 million units and expanded into multiple models, with further display-equipped “Ray‑Ban Display” and Oakley Meta glasses announced and shipping in 2025.(fr.wikipedia.org) Other AI smart glasses (e.g., from Alibaba) also entered the market.(theverge.com) That matches the idea that pendant-style devices would face competition from many vision‑based wearables “sucking in” real‑world visual information.

What did not come true:

• As of November 30, 2025, Apple has not released consumer smart glasses. Its only shipping head‑worn device is the Apple Vision Pro mixed‑reality headset (launched February 2024), which is bulky and positioned as a spatial computer, not everyday glasses.(apple.com) Apple’s true AR/smart‑glasses projects (“Apple Glasses” / N107, etc.) have been repeatedly postponed or cancelled, with reports that development was put on hold due to technical challenges and that any smart‑glasses launch is pushed to around 2027 at the earliest.(macrumors.com)
• Humane’s AI Pin, meanwhile, is being shut down in early 2025, well before any Apple smart glasses are expected to reach market.(theverge.com) That means the Pin never actually competed with Apple’s glasses in the marketplace and, given its discontinuation, never will.

Because:

• The prediction correctly foresaw that other computer‑vision wearables would emerge and that this category (along with the Pin’s flaws) would undercut the Pin’s chances as a phone replacement, but
• It specifically framed this in terms of direct competition with “Apple glasses,” which did not materialize within the Pin’s lifespan and are still not on the market,

…the overall outcome is mixed. Important elements are accurate, but the Apple‑glasses centerpiece is not, so the fairest evaluation is ambiguous, rather than cleanly right or wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, no brain–computer interface (BCI) or ocular-neural system exists that can record and later upload a person’s full, first-person, memory-like visual record of their experiences as a persistent, searchable life log.

Current state of the field:

• Elon Musk’s Neuralink and similar invasive BCIs are in very early human trials aimed at restoring function (e.g., helping paralyzed patients control cursors or prosthetics), not recording or replaying naturalistic memories or continuous first-person video of life experiences.
• Research BCIs can decode limited aspects of visual perception or imagined speech in constrained lab settings, typically using fMRI or implanted electrodes, and only over short time windows with heavy preprocessing. They do not approximate a full-life DVR of experiences or conversations.

The predictor explicitly framed this as “pretty far off” and effectively multi-decade. Since only ~1.5 years have elapsed since the prediction (April 2024 → November 2025) and the claimed long-term horizon has clearly not arrived, there is not yet a fair test of whether such a mature, memory-upload BCI will exist.

Therefore, the correct status today is “inconclusive (too early)”: the prediction has definitely not come true yet, but the timeframe the predictor implied has not expired, so it cannot be judged definitively right or wrong.

The prediction matches what actually happened.

1. The fix did stall past April 15, 2024. A $78B bipartisan tax bill (including restoration of immediate R&D expensing under Section 174) passed the House in January 2024 but remained stuck in the Senate as Americans filed by the April 15 deadline, and senators themselves warned it might be “too late” to salvage it for that filing season. (wsj.com) Later reporting shows the Senate effectively killed this bill, so no broad retroactive R&D fix for 2022–2023 passed in that Congress. (wsj.com) During 2023–2024 filings, businesses therefore had to capitalize and amortize R&D over five or fifteen years instead of expensing it immediately.

2. Many small, R&D‑intensive firms did experience significant financial strain from this rule (i.e., taxes on “phantom” profits).

   • A 2025 survey of founders by startup bank Mercury found that 73% said the R&D amortization change had a negative financial impact, and 44% reported operational changes such as cutting R&D budgets, slowing or reducing hiring, delaying/canceling projects, offshoring, and even layoffs. (mercury.com) These respondents are predominantly tech startups.
   • The U.S. Chamber of Commerce reports that, since mandatory R&D amortization began in 2022, many small and midsize businesses have suffered cash‑flow and liquidity problems and been forced to take high‑interest loans, raise prices, and stop hiring just to pay their higher tax bills. (uschamber.com)
   • A Senate small‑business roundtable summarized survey data showing a median 32% increase in tax bills (about $59,000) for small firms subject to the new R&D rules; 35% had to borrow to pay the tax, and 19% said their firm might go out of business, with additional impacts like reduced investment, hiring cuts, and layoffs. (congress.gov)
   • Industry letters (e.g., from manufacturing and startup groups) describe the R&D amortization requirement as causing “significant cash flow impacts” on startups and small businesses, forcing them to delay investments, forego hiring, and take out loans, and warn that “tens of thousands of jobs are at risk” if it remains. (nffs.org) The National Defense Industrial Association specifically notes that losing most of the R&D deduction creates dramatically higher tax bills that many companies, especially small defense‑related businesses, will struggle to manage, tying it to national‑security supply chains. (nationaldefensemagazine.org)
   • Policy and news analyses on Section 174 explicitly explain that amortization can make unprofitable startups appear profitable for tax purposes, resulting in tax bills despite having no real earnings — the textbook definition of “phantom” taxable income. (axios.com)

3. Timing relative to the 2023–2024 tax years. The amortization requirement has applied since tax years beginning in 2022, so its first big impact hit 2022 and 2023 returns (filed in 2023 and 2024), with continuing effects into 2024 filings, precisely the window the prediction referred to. (cbh.com) A later 2025 reform (creating new Section 174A and allowing some retroactive small‑business relief via amended returns) only arrived after this period and does not negate the substantial cash strain and operational damage many small tech, life‑sciences, and defense‑related firms reported during 2023–2024.

Given (a) the confirmed Senate stall beyond April 15, 2024, and (b) strong empirical evidence that a large number of small, R&D‑intensive U.S. businesses faced large tax increases, cash‑flow problems, borrowing needs, and cuts to R&D and hiring because of Section 174 amortization, the prediction that this stall would “hurt a lot of small businesses” through taxes on phantom profits is best judged right.

Legal/policy part of the prediction

• The January 2024 bipartisan framework and H.R. 7024 (“Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act of 2024”) would have restored immediate expensing only for domestic R&D while keeping foreign research expenditures subject to 15‑year amortization under §174. House and practitioner summaries explicitly state that foreign R&D costs would “continue” to be amortized over 15 years. (congress.gov)
• That specific 2024 bill ultimately stalled, but in 2025 the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) was enacted. OBBBA rewrote §174 so that it now applies only to foreign research, which “continues to be amortized” over 15 years for tax years beginning after December 31, 2024. A new §174A restores full expensing for domestic research. IRS guidance and technical summaries confirm this structure. (irs.gov)
• Multiple tax advisories after OBBBA describe current law as: (1) permanent or effectively permanent full expensing for domestic R&D, and (2) no change for foreign R&D, which must still be capitalized and amortized over 15 years, with no scheduled sunset. (manercpa.com)

This matches Friedberg’s core claim that the legislative fix would (and now does) leave in place a rule forcing US companies to spread offshore R&D over 15 years while giving much more favorable treatment to domestic R&D.

Economic consequences part of the prediction

• Practitioners and IRS commentary note that the §174 capitalization rules increased taxable income and reduced cash flow for R&D‑intensive firms when they first took effect, precisely because immediate deductions were replaced with slow amortization. (irs.gov)

• Under current law, a US company that does a growing amount of offshore R&D must still capitalize and deduct those costs slowly over 15 years, while domestic costs can be expensed. This generally means taxable income is higher than it would be under immediate expensing and can exceed “economic” profit, especially in growth phases when R&D spending is ramping up. Analysts explicitly warn that the foreign‑only capitalization regime may drive firms to relocate R&D to the US for tax reasons, which reflects the same underlying distortion Friedberg described. (grantthornton.com)

• His stronger language (“any” such business will “always” pay tax even at breakeven) is somewhat hyperbolic, because net operating losses, credits, or other deductions can offset tax in particular cases. But the directional mechanism—that a 15‑year amortization rule on foreign R&D raises taxable income relative to economic profit for growing firms with significant offshore R&D—is correct and is recognized in the professional commentary.

Given that (1) the law has in fact evolved so foreign R&D must be amortized over 15 years indefinitely while domestic R&D is expensed, and (2) this structure does exactly what he said in terms of tax distortions (even if not literally in every single case), the prediction is best classified as right overall.

Jason’s statement was a conditional warning about what would happen if two policy problems (R&D amortization and tight M&A/antitrust rules) were not fixed "over the next few years." As of late 2025, both the time horizon and the conditions of that hypothetical are not clearly met, so the prediction can’t be definitively judged.

Key points:

• R&D amortization has largely been rolled back for domestic R&D, at least prospectively. Congress restored immediate expensing for U.S.-based R&D, both via earlier relief tied to the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act of 2024 and then more comprehensively in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) in July 2025, which reinstates current-year expensing for domestic research costs for tax years beginning after December 31, 2024. (globalreporterjournal.com) That means the “fix this tax issue” part of his warning has, in substantial measure, been addressed, at least for domestic R&D.
• Before the rollback, Section 174 amortization was clearly harmful to startups, creating taxable income "out of thin air" and raising cash taxes for early‑stage tech companies, especially those with significant engineering costs. (theregister.com) So his concern about the tax rule itself was grounded in real pressure on startups.
• Antitrust / M&A constraints have not clearly been “eased” in a way that targets startup exits. FTC/DOJ data for FY 2024 show elevated enforcement (more Second Requests and intensive reviews) even as overall deal volume remains strong, and reporting through 2025 describes a still‑tough but functioning review environment—more scrutiny, but not an obvious pro‑startup relaxation. (reuters.com) There’s no decisive policy shift whose primary effect is to make it markedly easier for large firms to buy startups.
• Startup ecosystem outcomes are mixed and hard to attribute to these two levers alone. U.S. startup funding in 2025 has rebounded strongly—driven heavily by AI—suggesting robust capital for at least one large segment of tech. (reuters.com) At the same time, data on Series A conversion shows a harsh environment: only a small fraction of recent seed‑stage startups are reaching Series A, and timelines between rounds have lengthened, which implies elevated startup attrition. (wsj.com) However, those dynamics are affected by macro conditions, interest rates, and the AI platform shift—not just R&D tax policy and antitrust.
• Timeframe: Jason said "over the next few years." From April 2024 to late 2025 is only partway through that window, and we don’t yet have a full multi‑year picture of post‑reform startup formation and survival.

Because (1) one of his key conditions (the R&D tax problem) has been substantially addressed for domestic R&D, (2) the antitrust/M&A side has not seen a clearly defined, large pro‑startup easing, and (3) the ecosystem data is mixed and causally entangled with many other factors, we can’t cleanly say whether his specific conditional prediction—that failing to fix both issues would "kill a lot of startups" and materially damage U.S. startup formation—has come true. It’s simply too early and too confounded to judge either as clearly right or clearly wrong.

The prediction covers a long window — “the decade ahead” from roughly 2024 through 2034. As of now (November 30, 2025), only about a year and a half of that period has elapsed, so it’s too early to judge whether the full claim (sustained, decade‑long pressure leading to increasingly innovation‑distorting business taxes) is right or wrong.

Some early context:

• U.S. federal debt and projected deficits remain high, and official budget projections from bodies like the Congressional Budget Office anticipate continued upward pressure on spending, especially from entitlements and interest costs, which in turn imply pressure for higher revenues over the long term. This is directionally consistent with the motivation behind the prediction, but doesn’t by itself confirm the specific outcome about how new taxes will target innovative businesses.
• There have been ongoing debates and proposals around corporate minimum taxes, digital/service taxes, and higher taxes on large or highly profitable firms in tech and other sectors, but these are incremental and politically contested. It’s not yet clear that we are in a sustained regime where “more and more tax and all these weird ways that can really hurt industry” is definitively the pattern for the remainder of the decade.

Because the claim is (1) medium‑term macro‑fiscal, (2) explicitly about trends over an entire decade, and (3) stated in qualitative terms about how much new tax pressure will hurt innovation‑driven industries, we don’t have enough elapsed time or clear evidence to decisively deem it right or wrong. The appropriate classification as of 2025 is therefore “inconclusive (too early).”

Available data since early 2024 show exactly the pattern Chamath described: rapid growth of app‑based gambling in the U.S., heavily concentrated among young men, alongside worrying levels of problem gambling.

1. Usage of app‑based sports betting is rising sharply
• A February 2024 national survey found 19% of U.S. adults—and 39% of men 18–49—had an online sports‑betting account, with 91% of bettors having a betting app on their smartphone and most betting at least weekly.(sbu.edu)
• By February 2025, a follow‑up survey showed 22% of Americans—and 48% of men 18–49—had an active sportsbook account, a notable one‑year jump (19%→22% overall; 39%→48% for men 18–49).(scri.siena.edu)
• Industry and regulatory data indicate that ~80% of all U.S. sports bets were already placed via mobile apps by 2023, and commercial sports‑betting revenue in May 2024 was up ~25% year‑over‑year, underscoring rapid expansion of app‑based gambling.(rg.org)
• Operators report large year‑over‑year gains: BetMGM’s online sports revenue grew ~68% year‑on‑year in early 2025, and legal wagering on Super Bowl 2025 was projected to hit a record $1.39B, up over 11% from 2024.(investopedia.com)

2. Problem gambling and addiction are concentrated in young men and linked to apps
• A September 2024 Fairleigh Dickinson University national poll found that 10% of U.S. men aged 18–30 scored as problem gamblers versus 3% of the overall population, with problems strongly associated with online sports betting and online slots; the poll’s authors explicitly warn that online gambling is “creating a generation of problem gamblers.”(fdu.edu)
• Rutgers’ 2023 New Jersey prevalence study (widely cited in 2024 coverage) found that one‑third of bettors aged 18–24 wager exclusively online—about five times the share in 2017—and that 19% of 18–24‑year‑olds were at high risk for gambling problems, especially men.(oceancountyhealth.gov)
• National surveys of 18–22‑year‑olds show sports betting is widespread (58% have bet on sports; 28% use apps or websites), with measurable shares losing large sums (e.g., >$500 in a day), and public‑health reporting in 2025 continues to describe online gambling among youth as “on the rise.”(nyproblemgambling.org)
• Research summarized in 2025 coverage of sports‑betting scandals reports that in states where sports betting is legal, about 19% of 18–24‑year‑olds meet high‑risk criteria for gambling problems, again highlighting young men as the core at‑risk group.(businessinsider.com)

Taken together, these data show: (a) rapid growth in app‑based sports betting usage, particularly among young men; and (b) a substantial and growing cohort of young men exhibiting problem or high‑risk gambling behaviors strongly tied to those apps. That matches the substance and direction of Chamath’s prediction that app‑driven gambling and associated addiction among young men would "skyrocket" in the coming years, so as of late 2025 his prediction is best judged as right.

Evidence since the April 2024 podcast shows that app-based sports betting has already become a significant social issue in the U.S., centered heavily on young men, with clear financial and behavioral harms.

• A 2024 national Fairleigh Dickinson University poll found that about 10% of men aged 18–30 meet problem-gambling thresholds, versus 3% of the overall population, and explicitly links these elevated rates to online sports betting and online slots, warning that online gambling is creating a "generation of problem gamblers." (fdu.edu)

• A February 2025 Siena College/St. Bonaventure survey reported that 22% of Americans — including 48% of men aged 18–49 — have an online sportsbook account; among these bettors, 52% had chased losses, 37% felt ashamed after losing, and 20% had lost so much they struggled to meet financial obligations. A majority of Americans say online sports betting will create compulsive gamblers and want strong federal regulation, indicating broad recognition of social harm. (scri.siena.edu)

• Maryland’s 2025 prevalence study shows disordered gambling rising from about 4% in 2022 to 5.7% in 2024, with online/mobile sports betting participation jumping from 3% to 12% after legalization; nearly 15% of those who bet on sports met criteria for disordered gambling, and two‑thirds of disordered gamblers were male. (marylandmatters.org)

• In April 2025, the city of Baltimore sued DraftKings and FanDuel, alleging that their apps and marketing practices intentionally drive compulsive gambling and citing research that online sports betting is associated with serious social harms, including suicidal ideation and domestic abuse. The complaint frames these harms as a growing public health concern. (washingtonpost.com)

• Federally, lawmakers have reintroduced the SAFE Bet Act, explicitly arguing that the explosion of mobile sports betting is exploiting addiction, with "far too many – especially young people – driven into gambling abuse disorder," and calling for national public‑health style regulation. (blumenthal.senate.gov) In parallel, recent commentary in medical and policy outlets now describes sports-betting apps as a growing public health crisis whose primary casualties are young men, emphasizing the role of mobile apps and in‑play betting in fostering addiction. (statnews.com)

Taken together, these data and policy responses show (1) disproportionately high and rising problem gambling among young men tied to online/app-based sports betting, and (2) mounting public, legal, and regulatory treatment of it as a serious public health and social problem — all within the "next several years" window. That matches the spirit of Chamath’s prediction that the gamified sports betting apps used by young men would become a big problem, so the prediction is best judged as right.