Evidence shows that the 12–13 January 2024 US/UK strikes on Houthi targets did not stop or meaningfully deter Houthi attacks on shipping over the subsequent months of 2024. A January 2024 timeline notes that immediately after the strikes the Houthis publicly vowed to continue attacking ships in the Red Sea and declared US/UK interests legitimate targets, and attacks resumed within days. (ndtv.com)

Throughout 2024, independent monitoring and industry analysis report that Houthi attacks on commercial vessels persisted and even expanded in scope. A December 10, 2024 supply-chain analysis describes that, one year into the crisis, Houthis had targeted over 90 commercial vessels, damaged more than 30, sunk two ships, and that major ocean carriers were still avoiding the Red Sea, with canal volumes down sharply. (project44.com) An October 2024 overview likewise states that Houthi Red Sea attacks continued to “torment global trade,” with 130 attacks on the Red Sea recorded through September 20, 2024 and operators still hesitant to use the route. (aljazeera.com)

Security analysis from the Washington Institute shows the Houthi campaign progressing through new phases in 2024, expanding targets to US/UK-linked ships in January and then further broadening criteria in May and July 2024, indicating persistence rather than deterrence. (washingtoninstitute.org) Concrete incidents such as the July 19, 2024 missile and drone attacks on the container ship Lobivia in the Gulf of Aden further illustrate that Houthi anti-shipping operations continued months after the January strikes. (en.wikipedia.org)

Given this sustained pattern of attacks and continued large-scale rerouting of trade through 2024, Sacks’s prediction that the January 2024 strike would not deter the Houthis and that Red Sea trade disruption would continue for the ensuing months of 2024 was borne out by events.