Available evidence from the 2024 election and the year that followed does not support the claim that it "starts the breakdown of the two‑party system" via successful independent centrists.

1. Presidential results remained overwhelmingly two‑party. Donald Trump (Republican) won the presidency with 49.8% of the popular vote and 312 electoral votes; Kamala Harris (Democrat) received 48.3% and 226 electoral votes. Third‑party and independent presidential candidates together took only about 2% of the national popular vote, a historically modest showing and far below disruptive candidacies like Perot in 1992. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. No serious centrist independent presidential ticket emerged. The most visible centrist vehicle, No Labels, explicitly abandoned its plan for a 2024 unity ticket on April 4, 2024, after failing to find candidates with a plausible path to victory. (en.wikipedia.org) Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the highest‑profile independent, was not broadly characterized as a technocratic centrist; his campaign became associated with anti‑vaccine and populist themes, and his support collapsed to under 1% of the vote before he ultimately aligned with Trump and entered his administration. (en.wikipedia.org) This is the opposite of a durable, centrist third‑force breakthrough.

3. Congressional results show no structural break. In the 2024 Senate elections, the number of independent senators fell from four to two, with only Bernie Sanders and Angus King remaining, both still caucusing with Democrats. Independents took about 1.1% of the Senate popular vote. (en.wikipedia.org) In the 2024 House elections, independents won zero seats and just 0.57% of the national House vote; control of the chamber remained strictly between Republicans and Democrats. (en.wikipedia.org) This is consistent with the long‑standing two‑party structure rather than its breakdown.

4. Isolated strong independents did not translate into a systemic shift. A few high‑profile independents, such as Dan Osborn in the Nebraska Senate race, ran competitive campaigns (Osborn took roughly 46.5% against Republican Deb Fischer) but still lost, and no new centrist bloc or enduring third party emerged from these efforts. (en.wikipedia.org) Occasional strong independent runs have existed for decades and are not, by themselves, evidence of a structural turning point.

5. Post‑election narratives still describe a polarized two‑party system. Advocacy groups like the Independent Center have issued press releases claiming that 2024 showed independents "broke the two‑party system" because more voters self‑identify as independent. (independentcenter.org) But those self‑identified independents overwhelmingly voted for one of the two major parties; there was no corresponding surge in votes or seats for independent centrist candidates, and institutional control (presidency, Congress, state governments) remains firmly in Republican/Democratic hands.

Given (a) the extremely small vote share for third‑party and independent candidates, (b) the failure of a centrist unity presidential ticket to even make the ballot, (c) the decline—not rise—of independents in the Senate and their continued caucusing with a major party, and (d) the absence of any widely recognized structural realignment toward a multiparty system by late 2025, Chamath’s prediction that the 2024 election would start a structural breakdown of the two‑party system driven by independent centrists is best judged wrong, not merely premature or ambiguous.