Summary Friedberg’s compound prediction did not come true by the end of 2024. U.S. support became more politically contentious and had a temporary stall, but a large new aid package was passed; NATO publicly strengthened rather than weakened Ukraine’s membership prospects; and Ukraine was not widely regarded as having been “left behind” by Western backers in 2024.

1. U.S. financial and military support

• After months of congressional deadlock, the U.S. enacted Public Law 118‑50 on April 24, 2024, a $95.3 billion supplemental foreign‑aid bill, of which roughly $60+ billion was for Ukraine. This is a very large package by any historical standard, inconsistent with a clear-cut “resource” collapse. (en.wikipedia.org)
• According to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker and related summaries, by December 2024 the U.S. had provided roughly €114 billion in total aid to Ukraine (military, financial, humanitarian) since the full‑scale invasion, while European states combined had provided about €132 billion. The U.S. remained the single largest military donor, even as Europe overtook it in overall volume and made large new fiscal commitments in autumn 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Other analyses note a U.S. “aid crisis” from mid‑2023 to early 2024—aid slowed and Europe pulled ahead, especially on financial/humanitarian support—but this is described as a slowdown and shift in burden‑sharing, not a decisive disengagement. (ukraineworld.org) Overall, U.S. support in 2024 was politically fragile and somewhat lower in flow than 2022–23, but not a clear “material withdrawal” by year‑end.

2. NATO prospects

• At the NATO Washington Summit on July 10, 2024, all 32 NATO leaders signed a declaration stating that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” and that its path to membership is “irreversible”, while promising long‑term assistance and more structured NATO‑run training and coordination (NSATU). (ktvz.com)
• NATO countries simultaneously launched the Ukraine Compact and pledged a baseline of €40 billion in security assistance over the following year, explicitly framed as supporting Ukraine on this “irreversible path” to Euro‑Atlantic integration and eventual NATO accession. (novayagazeta.eu)
• This language is markedly stronger than earlier summit formulas (e.g., Vilnius 2023). Whatever one thinks about the practical timeline, the formal, public prospects for NATO membership did not “fade away” in 2024; they were rhetorically entrenched.

3. Perception of Ukraine being ‘left behind’

• Throughout 2024, Western institutions repeatedly signaled long‑term commitment: the NATO €40 billion baseline pledge, new EU and European instruments backed by profits from frozen Russian assets, and large multi‑year European aid packages. (kielinstitut.de)
• U.S. and European public opinion showed fatigue and growing polarization, but not a dominant narrative that Ukraine had already been abandoned. Late‑2024 U.S. polling still found sizable blocs saying support was “about right” or even “too little,” not an overwhelming view that the West had walked away. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The much clearer perception of Ukraine being sidelined by Washington emerges in 2025, after President Trump pauses U.S. military aid and broader U.S. foreign assistance, an event explicitly reported as a sharp policy break. (reuters.com) That development lies after the prediction’s end‑2024 horizon.

Conclusion By December 31, 2024:

• U.S. support had slowed and become contested but was still large and reinvigorated by a major supplemental bill.
• NATO’s formal stance put Ukraine on an “irreversible” path toward membership rather than letting its candidacy “fade.”
• Western governments, especially in Europe, were still deepening long‑term commitments, so Ukraine was not broadly perceived as already “left behind” in 2024.

Taken together, the specific scenario Friedberg outlined did not materialize by the end of 2024, so the prediction is best classified as wrong.