The prediction is explicitly about “over the long run” / “the coming decade” (roughly 2023–2033). As of today (2025-11-30), less than two years have passed since the podcast, so it is too early to judge decade‑scale effects on UK productivity and startup activity.

Current evidence on the UK tech/startup ecosystem is mixed but not decisively negative in a way that can be clearly attributed to the CMA’s merger process:

• The UK remains Europe’s leading tech ecosystem and raised about €17.5B in 2024, still the top destination for European tech investment, though down ~30% from 2023 in line with a broader global funding cooldown. (tech.eu)
• UK startup funding in H1 2025 fell by nearly a quarter year‑on‑year and deal count declined slightly, but the UK is still the best‑funded ecosystem in Europe; these trends are widely linked to global VC cycle shifts and AI‑focused reallocation rather than specifically to CMA merger rules. (sifted.eu)
• The CMA’s own 2024–2025 impact assessment and annual report emphasize large estimated consumer benefits from its interventions and a policy stance that frames competition enforcement as supporting innovation and growth, not undermining it, though these are self‑assessments and do not resolve the causal question either way. (gov.uk)

Because (a) the time horizon of the prediction (a decade) has not elapsed, and (b) existing data can be explained by broader macro and global VC conditions rather than clearly by CMA behaviour alone, the claim that the CMA’s current merger regime will over the long run measurably depress UK productivity and startup activity cannot yet be confirmed or falsified.