Key pieces of evidence point in different directions and the outcome depends heavily on how the “long disrupted / short GLP‑1 winners” trade is defined and weighted.

1. There was extreme outperformance into late 2023. Novo Nordisk (NVO) and Eli Lilly (LLY) were among the best‑performing mega‑caps from mid‑2023 to October 2023, while GLP‑1‑“disrupted” medtech names like Insulet (PODD) were down ~45% in Q3 2023 on GLP‑1 fears. (statmuse.com) This matches the premise of an exaggerated spread between GLP‑1 beneficiaries and those seen as losers.

2. Some disrupted healthcare names then strongly mean‑reverted. Insulet’s monthly adjusted price went from about $132.57 in October 2023 to the low‑$300s by late 2024 and mid‑$300s by November 2025, more than doubling from its GLP‑1‑panic lows. (digrin.com) ResMed, cited as hit by GLP‑1 concerns, traded near $132 in October 2023 and had rebounded to the $230–$270 range by 2024–2025, roughly an ~80–100% move off those lows. (investors.com) A long basket focused on these names from late 2023 would have performed very well.

3. Not all ‘disrupted’ names recovered. Dexcom, another diabetes‑device player often mentioned in the GLP‑1 overhang narrative, closed at $85.97 on Oct 20, 2023 and around the high‑$60s in October 2025, a loss of roughly 20%, and as of late 2025 it is one of the S&P 500’s weaker performers. (statmuse.com) Including such names materially dilutes the long‑disrupted basket’s gains.

4. GLP‑1 winners diverged: Novo normalized sharply, Lilly did not. Novo Nordisk’s ADR closed October 2023 near $92.95 and ended 2023 just under $100, but by late 2025 had fallen to around the low‑$50s, with commentary noting the shares are down on the order of ~44–50% year‑to‑date 2025 amid guidance cuts, trial disappointments, and competitive pressure. (statmuse.com) Shorting NVO from late 2023 would have been profitable by 2025.

   In contrast, Eli Lilly closed $576.33 on Oct 20, 2023 and has since traded above $1,000 per share in 2025, remaining one of the top large‑cap performers on the back of explosive tirzepatide (Mounjaro/Zepbound) sales. (statmuse.com) A short in LLY initiated in late 2023 would have been very painful and still underwater by late 2025.

5. Street consensus recognized GLP‑1 ‘fear’ in medtech as overdone, but there is no single, standard trade. By 2024–25, major sell‑side research (e.g., Morgan Stanley) was explicitly calling GLP‑1‑driven medtech derating “overdone,” arguing that the long‑term impact on many sub‑industries would be limited, and turning more constructive on stocks like Insulet after large drawdowns. (tipranks.com) That supports Chamath’s directional view that the extreme dispersion between GLP‑1 winners and perceived losers would not persist indefinitely.

Putting this together:

• On the qualitative call that the GLP‑1 winner vs. loser spread was too extreme and would partially mean‑revert, the data support him: key “disrupted” medtech names staged very large rebounds, and at least one flagship GLP‑1 winner (Novo Nordisk) subsequently suffered a major de‑rating.
• On the specific trade claim (“it’s probably okay to be on the other side” – long disrupted / short GLP‑1 winners from late 2023 onward), results hinge on implementation. A basket overweight Novo and heavily tilted to big rebounders like Insulet and ResMed could have done quite well; a basket that also aggressively shorted Eli Lilly or included weaker disrupted names like Dexcom could easily have lagged or even lost money over this horizon.

Because there is no canonical, widely‑tracked “GLP‑1 winners” and “disrupted healthcare” index, and reasonable basket choices lead to materially different P&Ls, the prediction cannot be cleanly scored as right or wrong across the board. Hence the outcome is best characterized as ambiguous rather than definitively correct or incorrect.