Jason predicted that the October 2023 Hamas attacks would ultimately renew and strengthen many governments’ and actors’ commitment to peace processes and normalization, rather than leading them to abandon those efforts.

There is substantial evidence that, despite the devastating war and public anger, key regional and global actors have indeed doubled down on diplomatic frameworks for a peace process and conditional normalization, instead of walking away from them:

• Saudi Arabia and broader Arab diplomacy: Since the Gaza war began, Saudi leaders have repeatedly re‑emphasized that a two‑state solution is the only acceptable framework and that any Saudi–Israel normalization is contingent on “credible, irreversible” progress toward Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia also formed a global alliance on the margins of the 2024 UN General Assembly to push for a two‑state solution and implementation of relevant UN resolutions, rather than shelving the issue. (atlanticcouncil.org)
• Multilateral push for a political framework (New York Declaration): In 2025, Saudi Arabia and France co‑chaired a major conference that produced the New York Declaration, a phased roadmap toward a two‑state solution, signed by all 22 Arab League members, the EU, and many other states. It calls for Hamas’s disarmament, a ceasefire, hostage release, and concrete steps toward Palestinian statehood—explicitly framing the war as something to be resolved via a renewed peace process. (dw.com)
• Moves toward recognition of Palestine as a tool to restart a peace track: Several Western states, such as Belgium (in coordination with France, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Saudi Arabia), have moved toward or announced recognition of a Palestinian state specifically to support a two‑state solution and increase diplomatic pressure for a negotiated settlement, not to abandon the idea of peace. (reuters.com)
• Formalized ceasefire and reconstruction framework tied to a broader peace process: The 2025 Gaza peace plan—a multilateral agreement between Israel and Hamas negotiated with extensive involvement from the US and Arab states—and its endorsement by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 created an International Stabilization Force, a Board of Peace, and a Palestinian governance committee in Gaza. This is explicitly framed as part of an Israeli–Palestinian peace process rather than a purely military outcome, showing renewed institutional investment in a diplomatic track. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Normalization frameworks strained but not abandoned: Academic and policy analyses of the Abraham Accords note that the Gaza war severely damaged public opinion and slowed new economic projects, tourism, and joint ventures. Yet, no existing normalization agreements (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan) were revoked; governments officially reaffirmed their commitment to the accords, even as some cooperation was delayed and symbolically downgraded. This indicates stress and backlash, but not a collapse of normalization; instead, the lesson drawn in these analyses is that sustainable prosperity requires coupling economic normalization with more robust conflict‑management and peace mechanisms. (ariel.ac.il)

Taken together, the behavior of governments and major diplomatic actors since late 2023 fits Jason’s core claim: rather than abandoning normalization and peace initiatives, they have generally preserved existing normalization, tied future normalization more tightly to a political settlement, and launched new, explicit frameworks (alliances, declarations, UN resolutions, and recognition moves) aimed at a negotiated two‑state outcome. While the path has been extraordinarily violent and public opinion in many societies is more polarized, the institutional and diplomatic commitment to some form of peace process has, if anything, been intensified rather than discarded. Hence, the prediction is best categorized as right, albeit with the caveat that this renewed commitment has coincided with, and been driven by, an exceptionally destructive war.